

The “Eastern Action” of the OUN(b) and the Anti-Jewish Violence in the Summer of 1941: The Cases of Smotrych and Kupyn

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Abstract

The article analyses the role of the OUN(b) activists in the commission of the anti-Jewish violence during the first weeks of Nazi occupation of Ukraine. What was the OUN(b) attitude to the Jewish minority on the eve of the war between the Third Reich and the USSR? How was the commission of the anti-Jewish violence by Ukrainian nationalists interconnected with their plans to expand the activity in the regions where they had never taken any actions before the war? Who were the perpetrators of anti-Jewish violence? The author offered answers to these questions on the examples of the mass murders committed by the OUN(b) activists and local residents during July-August 1941 in the Podillian towns Smotrych and Kupyn.

Key words: the Holocaust, anti-Jewish violence, Ukrainian nationalism, OUN(b), “Sich”

This article attempts to address a number of issues. The first one concerns the opinions expressed by the key members of the OUN(b) on the Jewish minority in 1940-1941, and how they correlated with the development of specific plans for their activities after the attack of the Third Reich on the Soviet Union. The second issue about the peculiarity of the “Eastern Action”¹ of the OUN(b) in summer 1941 is related to the efforts to expand their activities beyond Western Ukraine (where they have operated more or less actively in the interwar period) further to the territory that had been part of the Ukrainian SSR until September 1939. It also pertains to the relationship with the wave of anti-Jewish violence that swept Ukraine at the time. The third issue is related to resuming anti-Jewish violence in the towns of Smotrych and Kupyn in the Kamyanets-Podilskyi region in the first weeks of Nazi occupation, and to outline the possible motives for Ukrainian nationalists arriving from Western Ukraine and for local citizens to become engaged in it. The study

is mostly based on archive files of criminal cases from the archives of the Security Service of Ukraine (*Sluzhba bezpeky Ukrainy – SBU*). Some researchers of anti-Jewish violence in Ukraine in summer 1941 have already touched upon the issues.² The high relevance of the source remains undoubted. On the one hand, it stems from the Soviet investigation practices themselves when tools of physical and moral pressure were used.³ On the other hand, the archive criminal cases contain plenty of valuable information, which is particularly useful when contrasted with the data from other sources.

2 For more examples, see: Klymenko, Oleh and Serhii Tkachov. *Ukrainci v politsii v Dystrykti “Halychyna” (Chortkovskiy Okruh): Nimetskiy okupatsiyniy rezhyim v pivodennykh raionakh Ternopilshchyny u 1941-1944 rr.* Kharkiv: Ranok-NT, 2012; Rodal, Alti. “A Village Massacre: The Particular and the Context.” Ed. by Simon Geissbühler. In *Romania and the Holocaust: Events, Contexts, Aftermath*. Stuttgart: ibidem Press, 2016: 59-88; Struve, Kai. *Deutsche Herrschaft, ukrainischer Nationalismus, antijüdische Gewalt: Der Sommer 1941 in der Westukraine*. Berlin: de Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2015.

3 For more details see: Exeler, Franziska. “The Ambivalent State: Determining Guilt in the Post-World War II Soviet Union.” *Slavic Review* 75, No. 3 (2016): 606-629; Penter, Tanja. “Local Collaborators on Trial: Soviet War Crimes Trials under Stalin (1943-1953).” *Cahiers du Monde russe* 49, No. 2-3 (2008): 341-364.

1 For the term “Eastern Action”, see: Central State Archive of Supreme Bodies of Power and Government of Ukraine (Tsentralnyi derzhavnyi arkhiv vyshchykh orhaniv vlady ta upravlinnia Ukrainy – TsDAVOV), f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 14, ark. 15.

In general terms, the fate of the Jewish communities of Kupyn and Smotrych during the Second World War has already been highlighted in the historiography of the Holocaust.⁴ However, the facts considered in this text have not been introduced into the research discourse before. It was only in 2000 when a local historian Yuriy Oliynyk mentioned in one of his publications that the members of the OUN(b) who came to Smotrych in the beginning of Nazi occupation “took active part in exterminating Jewish population,” with no further details provided.⁵ In May 2016, in Kyiv, a public discussion on “Ukrainian Nationalism and Jews (1920s-1950s)” took place where I articulated preliminary research results from studying the episodes of summer 1941 in Smotrych and Kupyn.⁶ One of the participants of the public discussion, the head of Ukrainian Institute of National Memory, Volodymyr Vyatrovych, took part in a conference in March 2017 “The Shoah in Ukraine – New Perspectives on the Misfortunes of the 20th century.” In his report, he repeated some of the statements I voiced during the public discussion. Vyatrovych mentioned the events in Smotrych, but failed

to provide further details about Kupyn. Therefore, it made him show the engagement of OUN(b) activists in the anti-Jewish violence merely as a “breach on the part of local activists” of decisions of the Directorate of the OUN(b).⁷ On the whole, authors frequently tend to withhold the role of Ukrainian nationalists in persecutions of Jewish people during the Second World War by selectively quoting inconvenient sources, ignoring them or even negating their authenticity.⁸ On the contrary, the issue of anti-Jewish violence on the recently occupied territory of Ukraine in summer 1941, including also the involvement of Ukrainian nationalist groups in these events, has been repeatedly raised by Western scholars. It was most often exemplified by events in Eastern Galicia and Northern Bukovina, and more seldom – in Western Volhynia.⁹ As to the role of the

4 Kruglov, Aleksandr, Andrey Umanskiy i Igor Shchupak. *Kholokost v Ukrainie: Reykhskomissariat “Ukraina.” Gubernatorstvo “Transnistriya.”* Dnipro: Ukrainiyskiy institut izucheniya Kholokosta “Tkuma”, 2016: 547; Megargee, Geoffrey, and Martin Dean, eds. *Encyclopedia of Camps and Ghettos, 1933-1945.* Vol. 2. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012: 1470-1471; Spector, Shmuel, and Geoffrey Wigoder, eds. *The Encyclopedia of Jewish Life Before and During the Holocaust.* Vol. II. New York: NYU Press, 2001: 690-691; Ibid. Vol. III: 1205.

5 Oliynyk, Yuriy. “Borotba OUN-UPA proty okupatsiinoho rezhymu na Khmelnychchyni”. *Materialy X-oi Podilskoi istoriko-kraieznavchoi konferentsii, prysviachenoj 55-ii richnytsi peremohy u Velykii Vitchyzniani vinni.* Kamianets-Podilskyi: Kamianets-Podilskyi derzhavnyi pedadohichniy universytet, 2000: 75.

6 Public discussion “Ukrainian Nationalism and Jews (1920-1950).” <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qiVLNwDomDk&t=3552s> (Last accessed: September, 14, 2017).

7 I hereby express my gratitude to Oksana Cerisier for offering a video recording of the speech of Vyatrovych at the conference in Paris. A slightly modified text of his report was later published on a Ukrainian web portal “Zbruc”: Vyatrovych, Volodymyr. “Chy bula OUN antysemitskoju”. *Zbruc.* April 19, 2017. <https://zbruc.eu/node/64962>

8 Derevynskyi, Vasyl. *Stavlennia OUN(b) i UPA do susidnykh narodiv ta natsionalnykh menshyn.* Kyiv: Instytut istorii Ukrainy NANU, 2006; Patryliak, Ivan. “U poloni stiikykh stereotypiv: stavlennia Orhanizatsii Ukrainykykh Natsionalistiv do yevreiskoi menshyny v mizhvoiennyi period i pershi roky Druhoi svitovoi viiny”. *Drohobyttskyi kraieznavchyyi zbirnyk, спецвипуск II* (2015): 94-108; Vyatrovych, Volodymyr. *Stavlennia OUN do yevreiv: formuvannia pozystii na tli katastrofy.* Lviv: Ms, 2006.

9 For more on Eastern Galicia, see: Himka, John-Paul. “The Lviv Pogrom of 1941: The Germans, Ukrainian Nationalists, and the Carnival Crowd.” *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 53, № 2-4 (2011): 209-243; Struve. *Deutsche Herrschaft.* On Northern Bukovina, see: Geissbühler, Simon. *Blutiger Juli. Rumäniens Vernichtungskrieg und der vergessene Massenmord an den Juden 1941.* Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2013; Rodal. “A Village Massacre”: 59-88; Solonari, Vladimir. “Patterns of Violence: The Local Population and the Mass Murder of Jews in Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, July-August 1941.” *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 8, № 4 (2007): 749-787. On Western Volhynia, see: Snyder, Timothy. “The Life and Death of Western Volhynian Jewry, 1921-1945.”

OUN(b), there is a noticeable trend to explain actions of its activists rather through the prism of ideological motivation only.¹⁰ It is an obviously simplified explanation. After all, the level of ideological indoctrination of the OUN(b) activists, especially those who joined the organizational activity only in summer 1941, or not long before that time, requires more detailed study.

Presently, there are very few studies reaching beyond Western Ukraine. The texts by Wendy Lower and Oleksandr Melnyk offer the promising prospect of studying these issues beyond the common territorial framework and timeline.¹¹ This text will place particular emphasis on an absolutely understudied region in this respect, the Kamyanets-Podilskyi region (oblast'). On the one hand, it was part of the Ukrainian SSR before the events of September 1939, which made it impossible to observe any influence of Ukrainian nationalist ideas in the interwar period. On the other hand, due to its borderline location, it was one of the first regions which they managed to pervade in summer 1941, when it was turned into a sort of staging area for the "Eastern Action."

Ed. by Ray Brandon and Wendy Lower. In *The Shoah in Ukraine: History, Testimony, Memorialization*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008: 91-93; Spector, Shmuel. *The Holocaust of Volhynian Jews, 1941-1944*. Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1990: 64-71.

10 For more, see an illustrative review by Grzegorz Rossolinski-Liebe on the monograph by Kai Struve, and the further discussion between them: Rossolinski-Liebe, Grzegorz. "K. Struve: Der Sommer 1941 in der Westukraine." <http://www.hsozkult.de/publicationreview/id/rezbuecher-24974> (Last accessed - September, 14, 2016).

11 Lower, Wendy. "Pogroms, Mob Violence and Genocide in Western Ukraine, Summer 1941: Varied Histories, Explanations and Comparisons." *Journal of Genocide Research* 13, № 3 (2011): 217-246; Melnyk, Oleksandr. "Stalinist Justice as a Site of Memory: Anti-Jewish Violence in Kyiv's Podil District in September 1941 through the Prism of Soviet Investigative Documents." *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 61, № 2 (2013): 223-248.

"Clearing Our the Area from the Foe Elements": Views of OUN(b) on the Jewish Minority, 1940-1941

Most researchers agree that the attitudes of Ukrainian nationalists towards the Jewish minority started becoming more radical after 1933.¹² It was obviously not a one-time episode. It was related in a number of both external and internal factors. However, it appears that the final radicalization coincided not only with the early period of the Second World War, but also with the internal crisis within the OUN, which led to its split, and the further development in 1940/41 of two separate same-name organizations under the guidance of the chief (*vozhd*) Andriy Melnyk, and a leader (*providnyk*) Stepan Bandera – the OUN(m) and OUN(b), respectively. For the OUN(b) specifically, it was a period of tough political struggle with their rivals as well as active preparation for the expected military conflict between the Third Reich and the Soviet Union which was treated as an impetus to initiate "Ukrainian nation building." Since the late 1940s at the latest, all activities of the OUN(b) were aligned with the prospects of the forthcoming war.¹³

The landmark in the attitude of the OUN(b) towards the Jewish community in this period

12 For more details, see: Carynnyk, Marco. "Foes of Our Rebirth: Ukrainian Nationalist Discussions about Jews, 1929–1947." *Nationalities Papers* 39, № 3 (2011): 315-352; Hon, Maksym. *Iz kryvodoiu na samoti: ukrainsko-yevrejski vzaiemyny na zakhidnoukrainskykh zemliakh u skladi Polshchi (1935-1939)*. Rivne: Volynski oberehy, 2005; Kurylo, Taras. "The 'Jewish Question' in the Ukrainian Nationalist Discourse of the Inter-War Period." *Polin: Studies in Polish Jewry* 26 (2014): 233-258; Zaitsev, Oleksandr. *Ukrainskyi integralnyi natsionalizm (1920-1930-ti roky)*. *Narysy intelektualnoi istorii*. Kyiv: Krytyka, 2013.

13 Sectoral State Archive of the Security Service of Ukraine (Haluzevyi derzhavnyi arkhiv Sluzhby Bezpeky Ukrainy – HDA SBU), f. 5, spr. 67418, f. 3, ark 12.

is considered to be a fragment from the resolutions of the II Great Assembly of April 1941:

*Jews in the USSR present the most devoted support of the ruling Bolshevik regime, and they are the avantgarde of Moscow-based imperialism in Ukraine. Anti-Jewish attitudes are used by Moscow Bolshevik authorities in order to distract the focus of the Ukrainian masses from the actual cause of tribulation, so that in the time of disruption they would be targeted at Jewish pogroms. The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists fights Jews because of their support of the Moscow Bolshevik regime, at the same time raising awareness among the masses that Moscow is the main enemy.*¹⁴

The fragment clearly indicated the completion of the process of refining the depersonified image of Jews as sheer supporters of the Soviet regime and Russian imperialism. A negative attitude towards Jewish pogroms was declared therein as destructive and inspired from outside. It is also notable that it was the reason for derision on the part of political rivals from the OUN(m), alleging that the USSR “Jewish government” could not a priori “propagandize anti-Jewish”¹⁵ sentiments. They adduced this fragment in the abovementioned resolutions as a result of deliberate insinuations of one of the leading members of the OUN(b), Rik Yaryi, a “Jewish skinchanger Yaryi” who allegedly “in a mysterious way, wishes to save his semitic brothers from the inevitable final massacre in the USSR.”¹⁶

14 Dziuban, Orest, upor. *Ukrainske derzhavotvoorennia: Akt 30 chervnia 1941. Zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv*. Lviv; Kyiv: Piramida, 2001: 11.

15 HDA SBU, f. 13, spr 376, t. 9, ark 101.

16 Ibid., ark. 100 rev. The assumed Jewish origin of Yaryi, as well as his marriage with a baptized Jewish woman were a popular topic in anti-Bandera propaganda of the OUN(m). For more details, see: Carynyk. “Foes of Our Rebirth”: 327-

In order to have a deeper insight into the contents of the resolutions, they must be considered within the context of the prevailing moods among the leading activists of the OUN(b). Except for the statements of the OUN(m), there is no other information on Yaryi’s engagement in the phrasing of the resolutions of the II Grand Assembly. The young Ukrainian nationalists Ivan Mitrynh, Yaroslav Stetsko, Dmytro Myron, and Yaroslav Starukh were most actively involved.¹⁷ During 1940/41, at least three of them produced texts in which they described their attitudes towards the Jewish community.

In the text “Our Road of Struggle” published in 1940, Mitrynh described Jews as “internal enemies” and had no doubts about them being among those who would oppose the building of the Ukrainian state.¹⁸ On the whole, he suggested introducing a discriminatory policy on ethnic minorities in the future Ukrainian State. According to Mitrynh, the “evidently non-Ukrainian elements” should be on the lowest social standing:

*This element, provided they live in Ukraine and work in the allocated areas of life of Ukrainian people, will be entitled on the Ukrainian land to receive the earnings the Ukrainian authorities deem fair.*¹⁹

Along with it, he set the objective to cleanse “non-Ukrainian elements”, but failed to suggest any specific activities.²⁰ As regards the Jewish minority, Mitrynh stated that “the

328.

17 Archive of the Center for Research on the Liberation Movement (Arkhiv Tsentru doslidzhen vyzvolnoho rukhu – ATsDVR), f. 2, t. 1, od. zb. 1, ark. 58.

18 Oreliuk, Serhii [Mitrynh, Ivan]. *Nash shliakh borotby*. part 2. s.l.: s.n., 1940: 11.

19 Ibid., part 1: 98-99.

20 Ibid., 79, 83-84.

issue should be addressed separately.”²¹

In the same year of 1940, Myron published his text “Idea and Actions of Ukraine.” Like Mitrynha, he advocated for the need to “cleanse Ukrainian lands from the outside hostile elements of occupant states foreign to Ukraine, such as Poles, Moscals, Magyars, Romanians, and Jews.”²² In this respect, Myron claimed:

*Ukrainian nationalism is going to treat ethnic minorities in Ukraine in the way they treat the Ukrainian liberation struggle of Ukrainian people. Only those representatives of other nationalities who gained this right with the pain of their blood and property will have the right to stay in Ukrainian lands.*²³

Here is what he said specifically about the Jewish minority:

*We do not fight any special battle against the Jews. We are going to fight the Jews as a tool of hostile occupant states, and specifically as vehicles and advocates of Bolshevik’s oppression and propagators of the Communist doctrine.*²⁴

In the text “On the Subject Matter of Life of the State” written in about the same period, Stetsko principally assured that the government of the future Ukrainian state “in respect to national minorities is not going to have any extermination policy, but will provide for their cultural and economic development within integrity and sovereignty of the Ukrainian

State.”²⁵ It is notable that he made a similar statement in the late 1930s.²⁶ Parallel to it, Stetsko divided ethnic minorities into four categories: 1) supporters; 2) those who fight against the occupants but are either not in favour, or do not care about the creation of the Ukrainian State; 3) the oppressors themselves; and 4) “occupants’ aids.” He also included Jews in the latter category. It is not so easy to understand how the hierarchy developed by Stetsko was supposed to agree with the following passage, almost identical to what Myron had written:

*The position of the Ukrainian State towards ethnic minorities will be determined by their conduct in a time of national revolution, and in the period of consolidating the state.*²⁷

It appears that at least between Stetsko and Myron there was certain consensus on this issue. However, while at this stage it was really planned to grant to ethnic minorities a chance to prove their loyalty, there was nothing mentioned about how it could be implemented in practice.

At the same time, not only did the texts by Stetsko and Myron render their personal ideas, but also, to a certain extent, shaped the ideological environment inside the OUN(b). They had not lost their relevance during the initial stages of the war between the Third Reich and the Soviet Union.²⁸ For instance, on 20 July 1941 Starukh, in his report on organizing the printing of nationalist literature in the Kyiv region, expressed the

21 Oreliuk, Serhii [Mitrynha, Ivan]. *Nash shliakh borotby*. part 2. s.l.: s.n., 1940: 94.

22 Orlyk, Maksym [Myron, Dmytro]. *Ideia i chyn Ukrainy (Nacherk ideolohichno-politychnykh osnov ukraïnskoho natsionalizmu)*. s.l.: s.n., 1940: 48, 51, 119.

23 Ibid., 119.

24 Ibid., 119.

25 TsDAVOV, f. 3833, op. 2, spr 39, ark. 19.

26 Zaitsev. *Ukrainskyi integralnyi natsionalizm*: 280.

27 TsDAVOV, f. 3833, op. 2, spr. 39, ark. 19.

28 Stasiuk, Oleksandra. *Vydavnycho-propahandyvna diialnist OUN (1941-1953 rr.)*. Lviv: TsDVR; Instytut ukrainoznavstva im. I. Krypiakievycha, 2006: 22-23.

intention to republish both of Stetsko's texts "On the Subject Matter of Life of the State", but with the "brief supplement on Jews."²⁹ Unfortunately, there is no knowledge on the nature of this supplement or whether it was republished at all.

After the II Grand Assembly, the preparations of the OUN(b) activist group for the expected military conflict intensified.³⁰ It is known that Stetsko was one of those who in May 1941 personally developed the guidelines "Struggle and Activities of the OUN in Wartime" that were supposed to regulate the activities of the OUN(b) after the attack of the Third Reich on the Soviet Union. Bandera, Roman Shukhevych, and Stepan Lenkavskiy also contributed to the guidelines.³¹ In the guidelines, the hierarchy of ethnic minorities was much simpler than suggested earlier by Stetsko – "friends" and "foes" only. It is also notable that Jews were included in the "enemy ethnic minorities," along with Poles and Russians. Among other things, there were plans to register, isolate, and dismiss them from almost all positions, as well as to apply other discriminatory measures, including executions at the slightest suspicion of sabotage or loyalty to the Soviet regime. It was definitively declared that any possibility for assimilation of Jews would be definitively rejected.³² In the course of "cleansing the territory from the foe elements", the following statements were made:

In times of chaos and disarray, we can afford liquidating the unwanted Polish, Moscow,

29 Dziuban. *Ukrainske derzhavotvorennia*: 221.

30 Klymyshyn, Mykola. *V pokhodi do voli. Spomyny*. vol. 1. Toronto: Liha Vyzvolennia Ukrainy; Doslidnyi in.stytut "Studiium", 1975: 306.

31 ATsDVR, f. 2, t. 1, od. zb. 1, ark. 59, 68-69; Carynnyk. "Foes of Our Rebirth": 329.

32 HDA SBU, f. 13, spr 376, t. 6, ark 301-302. For a more detailed analysis of these guidelines, see: Carynnyk. "Foes of Our Rebirth": 329-332; Struve. *Deutsche Herrschaft*: 188-195.

*and Jewish figures, especially the supporters of Bolshevik Moscow imperialism.*³³

It undoubtedly implied that "Ukrainian state building" had to be accompanied with mass violence against ethnic minorities as based on the principle of collective responsibility. At the same time, it must also be kept in mind, according to the guidelines, that there are factors, which are major supporters of the NKVD powers and Soviet rule in Ukraine and must be destroyed during the period of establishing a new revolutionary order in Ukraine. The factors are the following: "... 2. Jews, both individually, and as a national group."³⁴ It was considered within the OUN(b) as a precondition for the successful implementation of their plans to create the Ukrainian state and destroy the possible opponents of this process.

"Nasty, dirty, and Jewish": Activities of the Marching Groups of the OUN(b)

The so called 'marching' cells or groups were supposed to be the striking force in implementing "Ukrainian state-building" on the territories that used to be part of the Ukrainian SSR before September 1939, thus out of the influence of Ukrainian nationalists. The OUN(b) Leadership (*Provid*) put forward this idea at the end of 1940.³⁵ With the start of war, they were supposed to advance following the front line, establish local governments and keep them under their control, disseminate nationalist propaganda, organize the network

33 Dziuban. *Ukrainske derzhavotvorennia*: 37.

34 HDA SBU, f. 13, spr. 376, t. 49, ark 2.

35 Matla, Zynovii. *Pivdenna pokhidna hrupa*. Munich: Nasha Knyhozbirnia, 1952: 3; Rehei, Vasyl. *Vid Stanu do Dnipra. Prychynky do istorii Pivdennoi pokhidnoi hrupy OUN 1941-1942 rr.* Kalush: Б. в., 1994: 8.

of the OUN(b), and engage therein the local population on a mass scale. Thus, accrediting mass support for their activities, the OUN(b) expected the Third Reich to recognize the Ukrainian State. The people needed for the establishment of the marching groups started in the early 1941 were selected from Ukrainian nationalists who were staying on the territory of the Governorate-General.³⁶ In Cracow, they created a Planning Center for Marching Groups of the OUN(b), including Vasyl Kuk, Roman Malashchuk, and Zenon Matla, who were in charge of their administration, numerical composition, the routes, the specific destinations for every member, and the functions they had to perform upon arrival.³⁷ Depending on the assigned roles, the selected staff were sent to undertake the respective training courses. Special emphasis was placed on studying the Russian language, Soviet literature, the peculiarities of state structure of the Ukrainian SSR, and customs of the local population.³⁸ It is known that at least Stetsko personally met the future members of the marching groups. He laid emphasis, among other things, on the following: "Only those will be able to live in our nation state who recognize our traditions, culture, language,

36 Archive of the Security Service of Ukraine in Lviv Region (Arkhiv upravlinnia Sluzhby bezpeky Ukrainy v Lvivskii oblasti – AUSBULO), f. 6, spr. P-36200, t. 2, ark. 106; Lebed, Mykola. "Orhanizatsiia protynimetskoho oporu OUN 1941-1943 rokiv". *Suchasnist*, № 1-2 (1983): 149.

37 Klymyshyn. *V pokhodi do voli*: 307; Malashchuk, Roman. *Z knyhy moho zhyttia. Spomyny*. vol. 1. Toronto: Homin Ukrainy; Doslidnyi instytut "Studiium", 1987: 227-228; Matla. *Pivdenna pokhidna hrupa*: 3, 7, 8.

38 HDA SBU, f. 5, spr 67418, t. 3, ark. 12; Ibid., f.6, spr 74327-FP, t. 1, ark. 65; Matla. *Pivdenna pokhidna hrupa*: 4; S.-Chartoryiskyi, Mykola [Sydor, Mykola]. *Vid Sianu po Krym (Spomyny uchasnyka III pokhidnoi hrupy-Pivden)*. New York: Hoverlia, 1951: 100; Chubai, Mstyslav [Dzyndra, Yaroslav]. *Reid orhanizatoriv OUN vid Popradu po Chorne more (Iz zapysnyka roiovoho)*. Munich: Nasha knyhozbiarnia, 1952: 26-27.

and respect our laws."³⁹

In total, three marching groups were established: the 1st North Group in Przemysl land, the 2nd Central Group in Chelm land, and the 3rd South Group in the Lemkivshchyna area. Each of them were given a distinctive mark to help recognize one another: it was supposed to be a seam, or a stitching thread of the respective color, barely noticeable on the clothing. A general codeword was also defined to help connect the members of the marching groups: "Where does God take you?" – "To where the pillars prop the skies."⁴⁰ Their total number was about 700 persons.⁴¹

The 3rd South Marching Group of the OUN(b) (*Pivdenna pokhidna hrupa – PPH*) was the most successful in its activities. It is also the best described group in available memoirs.⁴² The person in charge of its establishment was Tymish Semchyshyn, "Myroslav Richka", a county leader (*okruzhnyi providnyk*) of OUN(b)

39 Pavlyshyn, Luka. "Na hrani dvokh svitov..." *Spohady viiskovyka-banderivtsia*. Lviv: Spolom, 2010: 162.

40 HDA SBU, f. 6, spr. 74327-FP, t. 1, ark. 67-68; Ibid., t. 2, ark. 28; Klymyshyn. *V pokhodi do voli*: 319-320; Lysiak, Oleh. "Povernemos." *Homin Ukrainy*, № 29 (1957): 9; Matla. *Pivdenna pokhidna hrupa*: 7; Rehei. *Vid Sianu do Dnipra*: 9.

41 Lebed. «Orhanizatsiia protynimetskoho oporu»: 150.

42 In addition to the abovementioned, see: Zovenko, Orest [Khovailo, Osyp]. *Bezimenni. Spohad uchasnyka novitnikh vyzvolnykh zmahan*. s.l.: s.n., 1946; Lysiak, Oleh. "Den 30 chervnia 1941 i pershi dni pislia toho (Spohad uchasnyka pokhidnykh hrup OUN)." *Shliakh Peremohy*, № 31 (1979): 2, 5-6; Lysiak, Oleh. "Po skhidnomu marshrutu (Spomyn uchasnyka pokhidnykh hrup)". *Almanakh "Homonu Ukrainy" na rik 1961*. Toronto: Homin Ukrainy, 1961: 146-150; Oliinyk, Roman. "Intsydent na dorozhi do Krymu". *Vyzvolnyi Shliakh*, № 7 (1998): 817-818; Pasichniak, Vasyl. "Prozirky z moho tverdoho zhyttia». red. Mykhailo Marunchak. *V borotbi za Ukrainsku derzhavu. Esei, spohady, svidchennia, litopysannia, dokumenty Druhoi svitovoi viiny*. Winnipeg: Svitova liha ukrainських politychnykh viazniv, 1990: 569-575; Pashchak, Yaroslav. "Pivdenna pokhidna hrupa OUN. Storinky spohadiv". *Dzvin*, № 8-9 (1998): 87-91; Tselevych, Uliana. "Pokhidni hrupy v Ukraini". *Shliakh Peremohy*, № 26 (1967): 5.

in Lemkivshchyna. He learned about the plan to establish marching groups in February 1941 from the OUN(b) leader in the Governorate-General Yaroslav Khomiv, "Limnytskyi." He ordered Semchyshyn in April 1941 to start establishing the swarms (*roi*) of the future PPH from the Ukrainian nationalists subjected to him. The respective lists were compiled, and the swarm leaders (*roiiovi*) were appointed. For this purpose, every participant was supposed to fill in the questionnaire and indicate, among other things, which field of the future Ukrainian state he preferred working in.⁴³ The core of the PPH consisted of the members of the Unit of Young Men (*Kurin molodi*) in the Ukrainian Relief Committee (*Ukrainskyi Dopomohovyi Komitet*) in Sanok, a legal youth entity headed by the same person, Semchyshyn.⁴⁴ In May 1941, he received from Cracow 10 copies of the guidelines "Struggle and Activities of the OUN in Wartime" that he sent out to his subordinates, and personally controlled how they studied them. Two or three days before the attack of the Third Reich on the Soviet Union, Semchyshyn received an order to appoint him as leader of the PPH, and established the command staff that included five referents – personal, military, economic, communications, and propaganda, and a typist lady. In addition, they were also joined by a member of the OUN(b) Leadership, Matla.⁴⁵

Initially, the numerical composition of the PPH was up to 300 persons, but it soon went down to 200.⁴⁶ Members of the PPH were

divided into swarms, with 5 to 12 persons in each. The swarm included a leader and his deputy, the Security Service (*Sluzhba Bezpeky – SB*) referent, a propagandist, an economic provisor, an overnight vigilant, a person in charge of establishing local authorities, and a signalman. Upon arrival to destinations, they established regional, county and district authorities of the OUN(b).⁴⁷ Members of the PPH travelled on foot, but more often, rode bicycles, on carts, and one of the swarms even used a bus for several days.⁴⁸ The communication between the PPH command staff and the swarms was established with the help of a special password: "What is your glory?" – "It's cossack's, and bloody."⁴⁹ Besides, every swarm had its encoded name that was indicated in black ink on the landmarks along the route to inform those who followed.⁵⁰

In fact, within the two weeks upon the Third Reich's attack on the Soviet Union, the PPH managed to go through all of East Galicia

of which had already left by that time for different destinations in East Galicia (Lviv, Drohobych, Sambir, Skole, Ternopil, a.o.): Dziuban. *Ukrainske derzhavotvorennia*: 217; TsDAVOV, f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 14, ark. 22-24. Among the persons who had left the PPH was, for example, Bohdan Pidhaynyi. He left for Lviv where he applied to be a Wehrmacht interpreter, on the orders of the land leader (*kraiovyi proviǎnyk*) of OUN(b) Ivan Klymiv – "Yevhen Legenda": Pidhaynyi, Bohdan. "Haudeamus". *Visti Kombatanta*, № 3 (243) (2005): 55-57. Two other participants of the PPH who left for Lviv, the brothers Volodymyr and Yevhen Kachmarski, enrolled to local police: Rich, David Alan. "Armed Ukrainians in L'viv: Ukrainian Militia, Ukrainian Police, 1941 to 1942." *Canadian-American Slavic Studies* 48, № 3 (2014): 282-283.

47 HDA SBU, f. 6, spr. 74327-FP, t. 2, ark. 26-27, 50; Chubai. *Reid orhanizatoriv OUN*: 6.

48 Information sheet № 1, 13 July 1941, ATsDVR (not compiled), ark. 1; Lysiak. "Den 30 chervnia": 2; Matla. *Pivdenna pokhidna hrupa*: 9; Rehei. *Vid Sianu do Dnipra*: 10.

49 HDA SBU, f. 6, spr. 74327-FP, t. 2, ark. 28.

50 For example, the swarm, that included members of the command staff of PPH was called "T1": HDA SBU, f. 6, spr. 74327-FP, t. 1, ark. 68; TsDAVOV, f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 14, ark. 20, 25.

43 HDA SBU, f. 6, spr. 74327-FP, t. 1, ark. 65-66.

44 Rehei. *Vid Sianu do Dnipra*: 4.

45 HDA SBU, f. 6, spr. 74327-FP, t. 1, ark. 64, 66-67.

46 AUSBULO, f. 6, spr. P-36200, t. 2, ark. 108; HDA SBU, f. 6, spr. 74327-FP, t. 1, ark. 65. As of July, 9, 1941, Semchyshyn was aware of 286 participants in the PPH who crossed the Sian, 95

up to Ternopil, where they stayed for several days. When summarizing the activities over this period, Semchyshyn emphasized the following functions which the subordinate swarms were performing: “liquidating the harmful and foe elements (NKVD officers, secret agents, Jews, Poles, and Moskals).”⁵¹ They then received more detailed instructions on activities in that respect. “We were authorized to grant awards for good deeds, and assign punishment for infringements against the Nation”, as the swarm leader Mykola Sydor mentioned in his memories.⁵² In fact, the MSG was only supposed to engage in its activities after crossing the former Polish-Soviet border along the Zbruch river.⁵³ In Ternopil, a first update was received on the situation beyond Zbruch – on the territory of the recently occupied Kamyanets-Podilskyi region. The “Information Bulletin” of the PPH noted the inert attitudes of locals, as well as anti-Semitic attitude: “People hate the Jews but there is not any specific response.”⁵⁴ It obviously contrasted with the events in Western Ukraine resulting in a wave of Jewish pogroms in summer 1941, including in localities that the PPH itinerary ran through, such as Dobromyl, Sambir, Drohobych, Stryi, Rohatyn, Berezhany, Ternopil, among others.⁵⁵ In Ternopil, they finalized the make-up of the swarms of the PPH that had to leave to

their destinations from there, particularly the swarm “K1” under the guidance of Mykola Kozak who on 15 July 1941 set out towards Kamyanets-Podilskyi through Skala-Podilska and Husiatyn.⁵⁶ “On its way, the swarm “K1” entered the villages, held public meetings, liquidated NKVD officers and other bastards who remain”, as Kozak reported on 31 July 1941.⁵⁷

The impressions of Ukrainian nationalists of their stay on the territory of Kamyanets-Podilskyi region could be implied from the notes of a female member of the PPH about the first town they arrived in: “Volochnysk leaves a bad impression. A dilapidated Jewish and dirty town.” The description she left about the next stop, the town of Proskuriv, was similar: “Nasty, dirty, and Jewish. You don’t even feel like staying longer.”⁵⁸ In line with the guidelines “Struggle and Activities of the OUN in Wartime,” members of the PPH had to observe the moods and attitudes among the local population, in order to identify contact points that could be used to disseminate nationalist propaganda among them. Initially, it was not an easy task. Local people treated them suspiciously, taking them for Poles or even Germans who could speak Ukrainian, and in order to convince them of the contrary, they had to take much time.⁵⁹ In their reports, members of the PPH noted the attitude of local population towards Jews. For instance, we read about the Proskuriv district:

51 Information sheet № 1, 13 July 1941, ATsDVR (not compiled), ark. 1.

52 S.-Chartoryiskyi. *Vid Sianu po Krym*: 101.

53 AUSBULO, f. 6, spr. P-36200, t. 2, ark. 109.

54 Information Bulletin № 1, 13 July 1941, ATsDVR (not compiled), ark. 2.

55 The most holistic information on the events in these settlements is presented by Struve. *Deutsche Herrschaft*: 216-234, 433-442, 446-464, 492-496, 502-515, 591-621. The fact that the PPH members were at least the eye-witnesses of the anti-Jewish violence in Dobromyl and Stryi is confirmed in the memoirs of the swarm leaders Mykola Sydor and Yaroslav Dzyndra: S.-Chartoryiskyi. *Vid Sianu po Krym*: 29-30, 56, 59; Chubai. *Reid orhanizatoriv OUN*: 18.

56 HDA SBU, f. 6, spr. 74327-FP, t. 2, ark. 37; Lysiak. “Den 30 chervnia”: 2; Order № 12, 15 July 1941, ATsDVR (not compiled), ark. 1, 4; Report № 5, July, 20, 1941, ATsDVR (not compiled), ark. 1.

57 TsDAVOV, f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 14, ark. 13.

58 Dziuban. *Ukrainske derzhavotvorennia*: 239.

59 HDA SBU, f. 6, spr. 74327-FP, t. 1, ark. 77; Dziuban. *Ukrainske derzhavotvorennia*: 239; Zovenko. *Bezimenni*: 65-66; Pasichniak. “Prozirky”: 570; S.-Chartoryiskyi. *Vid Sianu po Krym*: 112-114; Chubai. *Reid orhanizatoriv OUN*: 29, 33.

*Villagers hated the Jews and mentioned the Jews as a source of the whole disaster. During times of starvation, Jews in cities had bread to eat. People are happy when the Germans shoot the Jews down.*⁶⁰

The attitudes in the Volochysk district were described in the following way:

*In villages, there are no Jews, but they are in the towns. And they threaten to bathe in Ukrainian blood. That is why residents in some localities of the Volochysk district do not even sleep at homes, as they fear the Jews.*⁶¹

In the report on the situation in Felshtyn district, we can find the following passage:

*Their ongoing shootings in the fields and the Jews are somewhat depressing. Later, upon demand by the village, a small cleansing of the Jewish community was conducted. Later, the villagers, mostly women, regretted it was not enough... The hatred against Moskals and Poles is weak, but it is mostly pointed against the Jews.*⁶²

It is known that in Felshtyn district the swarm

⁶⁰ Extracts from reports, 19 July 1941, ATsDVR (not compiled), ark. 1.

⁶¹ Ibid. It is notable that the same attitudes were recorded by the members of the Nachtigall battalion consisting of OUN(b) activists. Viktor Kharkiv, a commander of one of Nachtigall's detachments, wrote in his autobiography about the events during transit through the Kamyanets-Podilskyi and Vinnytsia region: "During our march, we personally saw the victims of Jewish Bolshevik terror. It intensified our hatred to Jews so much that in two villages we shot down all the Jews we came across. I recall an episode. During our march, before one village, we saw many wandering people. When asked, they replied that Jews were threatening them and they are afraid to sleep over in their homes. As a result, we shot down all the Jews we came across there.": Patryliak, Ivan. *Viiskova diialnist OUN(b) u 1940-1942 rokakh*. Kyiv: Instytut istorii Ukrainy NANU, 2004: 362 (the text is verified according to the original: TsDAVOV, f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 57, ark. 17).

⁶² Extracts from reports, 19 July 1941, ATsDVR (not compiled), ark. 2.

"A1" operated under the guidance of Sydor. In his memories, he paid much attention to describing relations with Jewish community of Felshtyn and even gave a detailed account on how one local Jew he calls Solomon Moyseyovych murdered another one, Motya Dovhyi. It was allegedly committed in revenge for his collaboration with the Soviet regime.⁶³ Ukrainian nationalists, according to Sydor, did not support such murders, and even sentenced Solomon Moyseyovych to the punishment of 25 beatings.⁶⁴ He did not mention a word about his personal engagement in committing a "small cleansing of the Jewish community." After all, it fully fit within the post-war nationalist narrative. Instead, in her testimonies, a Felshtyn Jewish lady Etya Tsalevich, presents the stay in the town of a "police subdivision of Western Ukrainians" (as she called the visiting Ukrainian nationalists) in an absolutely different light. According to her, in Felshtyn, they robbed and killed several Jewish families. Tsalevich eye-witnessed one of the murders herself. They were a father and two sons Bukivkers who were killed not far from their house, and a mother was injured.⁶⁵

Upon the whole, the main manpower of the PPH did not stay long on the territory of the Kamyanets-Podilskyi region, and on 24 July 1941 they had to be around Vinnytsia.⁶⁶ Parallel to this, the Land leadership (*Kraiovyi provid*) of the OUN(b) was organized in Lviv and sent additional swarms to follow the PPH. One of them was headed by

⁶³ S.-Chartoryiskyi. Vid Sianu po Krym: 129-140.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 139.

⁶⁵ Yad Vashem Archive (hereinafter – YVA), O.3/3734, Etya Tsalevich. cf.: HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 66889, t. 3, ark. 67-67 rev.

⁶⁶ Order № 16, 19 July 1941, ATsDVR (not compiled), ark. 1.

Volodymyr Zbrozhyk-“Bolotov.”⁶⁷ In Chortkiv in the Ternopil region, they received blue and yellow flags and arm bands as well as food, money, and armed security from a special unit established by the OUN(b) to help the “Eastern Action.” On 19 July 1941, they arrived in Kamyianets-Podilskyyi where Zbrozhyk took the position of the regional leader (*oblasnyi providnyk*) of the OUN(b). After they familiarized themselves with the situation in the city, Ukrainian nationalists reported on the ethnic composition of the local population: “60 % - Jews, 20 % - Moscowized Ukrainians, 10 % - good Ukrainians, 10 % - Moskals.”⁶⁸ On 21 July 1941, the swarm “K1” also arrived in Kamyianets-Podilskyyi, and its leader Kozak replaced Zbrozhyk in the position of regional leader of the OUN(b).⁶⁹ In the first place, they started an active propaganda campaign. A local Ukrainian man, Ivan Marunchak, reported about the first days of the Nazi occupation of Kamyianets-Podilskyyi: “I also saw there many different mottos, such as “Long Live Bandera!”, “Long Live Independent United Ukraine!”, “Glory to Ukrainian Nationalists!”, “Long Live Adolf Hitler – Liberator from Bolshevism!”⁷⁰ Ukrainian nationalists received from the German occupant administration a permit to establish a Kamyianets-Podilskyyi regional administration and militia. Zbrozhyk was appointed as commander of the regional militia. In fulfilling the Kozak’s orders to seize local authorities and trying to address all issues “from a nationalist standpoint,”

67 TsDAVOV, f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 14, ark. 15. Regarding the composition of Zbrozhyk swarm, see: *Ibid.*, ark. 34.

68 *Ibid.*, ark. 15.

69 *Ibid.*, ark. 13. Regarding the composition of swarm K1, see: Lysiak. “Day of June, 30”: 2; Order № 12, 15 July 1941, ATsDVR (not compiled), ark. 1.

70 Marunchak, Ivan. *Kurkulskyyi nedobytok. Spohady*. Kyiv: Vseukrainske tovarystvo politychnykh viazniv i represovanykh, 2002: 62.

several more dozen arrivals enlisted in the militia or other entities in Kamyianets-Podilskyyi.⁷¹ Kozak instructed them to show up at work on time and to “honestly and duly” fulfil their duties.⁷² Eventually, the OUN(b) managed to rather quickly cover with its activities basically all southern districts of the Kamyianets-Podilskyyi region. In the district centers and villages, Ukrainian nationalists advocated the idea of Ukrainian statehood, created local authorities, such as militia units.⁷³ Among other things, it helped them to successfully overcome their political rivals from OUN(m) who were also trying to expand their influence to the region. When a Bukovinian battalion (*Bukovynskyyi kurin*) arrived in Kamyianets-Podilskyyi in the second half of August 1941 on the initiative of the OUN(m), their activities were not only neutralized but several dozens members were also drawn over to the side of the OUN(b).⁷⁴ Still during the movement of PPH, the first conflicts emerged with the Nazi occupation authorities.⁷⁵ Considering the suspicious attitude towards their activities, Ukrainian nationalists were forced to postpone the implementation of a number of their initiatives. For instance, the military referent of a PPH, Metodiy Pavlyshyn-“Viktor Lisovskyyi”, told that his duties initially included

71 Archive of the Security Service of Ukraine in Ternopil Region (Arkhiv upravlinnia Sluzhby bezpeky Ukrainy v Ternopilskii oblasti – AUSBUTO), f. 5, spr. 32372, t. 1, ark. 130; Dziuban. *Ukrainske derzhavotvorenna*: 308-309, 313.

72 *Ibid.*, ark. 13. Regarding the composition of swarm K1, see: Lysiak. “Day of 30 June”: 2; Order № 12, 15 July 1941, ATsDVR (not compiled), ark. 1.

73 Marunchak, Ivan. *Kurkulskyyi nedobytok. Spohady*. Kyiv: Vseukrainske tovarystvo politychnykh viazniv i represovanykh, 2002: 62.

74 Archive of the Security Service of Ukraine in Ternopil Region (Arkhiv upravlinnia Sluzhby bezpeky Ukrainy v Ternopilskii oblasti – AUSBUTO), f. 5, spr. 32372, t. 1, ark. 130; Dziuban. *Ukrainske derzhavotvorenna*: 308-309, 313.

75 TsDAVOV, f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 14, ark. 33.

establishing the units so called “Sich” out of the volunteers of local population, as military garrisons on the district, county and regional levels. They had to act as nuclei of the future Ukrainian Army. During his stay in Ternopil in July 1941, Pavlyshyn received a new order – not to create the “Sich” units, since the Germans had not recognized the Ukrainian state, and therefore prohibited the creation of any army.⁷⁶ Despite this, the PPH members still created on the territory of the Kamyanets-Podilskyi regional units called “Sich,” which only had the militia functions.⁷⁷ After all, the local population used to call the OUN(b) activists “Sich fighters” (*sichovyky*).⁷⁸ Later, the contradictions further increased. In Kamyanets-Podilskyi, Ukrainian nationalists banned printing

their literature and conducting any propaganda activities in general. They were primarily expected to help with harvesting.⁷⁹ “We are treated as mere workforce. It was said that we only have to work but not to politicize” – complained one of the intermediaries between the Germans and the regional OUN(b) administration, Denys Prytuliak.⁸⁰ On 29 July 1941, Kozak anticipated that they would have to leave the territory of the Kamyanets-Podilskyi region, and emphasized the need to more actively create a network organization.⁸¹ His prognoses were not without any grounds. On 31 July 1941, Field-Commandant Jozef Meiler informed the commanders that Ukrainian nationalists arrived in Kamyanets-Podilskyi and tried to influence local authorities. “Please, provide clear instructions as soon as possible, - he wrote, - whether we have to tolerate them here or send them back to Lviv.”⁸² On 5 August 1941, a secret order was issued to the 17th Army, obliging the prevention of the penetration of Ukrainian nationalists further into the regions beyond Zbruch. They had to be detained and promptly put in charge of the 1C division.⁸³ In Kamyanets-Podilskyi, the activities of the OUN(b) activists were terminated within a month upon their arrival in the city. Formal reasons for this were disputes over land and the activities of Ivan Nanenko, the then head of the

76 For example, regarding activities in the district centers Dunayivtsi and Orynyn, see: AUSBUTO, f. 5, spr. 32372, t. 1, ark. 108-109, 114-115, 129 rev. -131 rev. For Stara Ushytsia, see: AUSBUTO, f. 6, spr. 10634-P, ark. 14-14 rev., 16 rev. -17; Archive of the Security Service of Ukraine in Khmelnytskyi Region (Arkhiv upravlinnia Sluzhby bezpeky Ukrainy v Khmelnytskii oblasti – AUSBUKhO), f. 5, spr. 24118, ark. 33 rev.; Havryliuk, Osyp. “*Ne skuie dushi zhyvoi...*” Ivano-Frankivsk: Nova Zoria, 2012: 93-99.

77 OUN Archive in Kyiv, f. 1, op. 2, spr. 440, ark. 20; Veryha, Vasyl. “Bukovynskyi kurin 1941”. Pid red. Kost Melnyk, Oleh Lashchenko ta Vasyl Veryha. *Na zov Kyieva. Ukrainskyi natsionalizm u II svitovii viini: Zbirnyk stattei, spohadiv i dokumentiv*. Toronto; New York: Vydavnytstvo “Novyi Shliakh”, 1985: 111; Duda, Andrii i Volodymyr Staryk. *Bukovynskyi kurin v boiakh za Ukrainsku derzhavnist 1918-1941-1944*. Kyiv; Chernivtsi: Tovarystvo “Ukrainskyi narodnyi dim v Chernivtsiakh”, 1995: 78-79.

78 Oliinyk. “Borotba OUN-UPA”: 74-75. Local militia men received blue and yellow armbands with the “Sich” inscription. For example, see: AUSBUKhO, f. 5, spr. 20499, ark. 17-17 rev.; University of Southern California Shoah Foundation Institute Visual History Archive (hereinafter – USC SFI VHA), # 15814, Ilya Kelmanovich. Members of PPH also were wearing blue and yellow armbands: HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 66889, t. 3, ark. 8, 10; Dziuban. *Ukrainske derzhavotvorennia*: 378; Chubai. *Reid orhanizatoriv OUN: 20-21; Yaroslavskyi. “Vid Sianu po Dinets”*: 18.

79 Dziuban. *Ukrainske derzhavotvorennia*: 308, 313.

80 Ibid., 313.

81 Ibid., 308.

82 Hoppe, Bert, und Hildrun Glass, bearb. *Die Verfolgung und Ermordung der europäischen Juden durch das nationalsozialistische Deutschland 1933-1945. Band 7: Sowjetunion mit annektierten Gebieten I: Besetzte sowjetische Gebiete unter deutscher Militärverwaltung, Baltikum und Transnistrien*. Munich: Oldenburg Verlag, 2011: 221.

83 Dziuban. *Ukrainske derzhavotvorennia*: 378.

Kamyanyets-Podilskyi Land Administration. Despite the fact that Nazi occupation administration envisaged to preserve the collective farms system, the OUN(b) activists proceeded to liquidate the collective farms, to allocate the land, equipment and the collected harvest among the peasants. Nanenko, who was in charge of the land issue, requested explanations from Kozak but he replied that he was executing the orders of his Leadership. Nanenko then complained directly to the Field-Commandant Meiler, who ordered Ukrainian nationalists to leave the territory of the Kamyanyets-Podilskyi region within 24 hours. "I waged a fight with Banderovites for personal reasons, as I did not agree with their actions," Nanenko later reported.⁸⁴

Activities of the OUN(b) in the southern parts of the Kamyanyets-Podilskyi region coincided with the initial stage of carrying out the Holocaust in the region. There are testimonies that Hungarian soldiers forced Jews to exhume bodies of the victims of the Soviet regime discovered in the Kamyanyets-Podilskyi fortress.⁸⁵ These events might be related to the mass killings that Zbrozhyk swarm members witnessed on 20 July 1941, the second day after their arrival in the city: "Magyars committed pogroms of Jews and shot down about 700 Jews."⁸⁶ In the beginning

84 AUSBUKhO, f. 6, spr. P-28095, t. 1, ark. 30-32. On removing OUN(b) activists from Kamyanyets-Podilskyi and the surrounding settlements, see also: AUSBUTO, f. 6, spr. 10634-P, ark. 17-17 rev.; Havryliuk. "Ne skuie dushi zhyvoi...": 99-102; Korbutiak, Dmytro. *Vtecha do svobody*. Spohady. Б. м.: Б. в., 1999: 181; Marunchak. *Kurkulskyi nedobytok*: 64; TsDAVOV, f. 3836, op. 1, spr. 65, ark. 1.

85 Marunchak. *Kurkulskyi nedobytok*: 63.

86 TsDAVOV, f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 14, ark. 15. According to other data, 400 Jewish men were killed: Tenneblat, Bina. "Ya ostalas sovershenno odna...". Sost. Boris Zabarko. in *Zhivymi ostalis tolko my. Svidetelstva i dokumenty*. Kiyev: Institut iudaiki, 1999: 413.

of August, 1941, local Jews were tossed into the ghetto.⁸⁷ According to the available testimonies, local militia men were engaged in forced resettlements and custodial oversight of the ghetto, and also in conveying the Jews from there to perform different jobs in the city and beating them while doing so.⁸⁸ Between 26 and 28 August 1941, the command squadron of the supreme head of police and SS "Russia-South" and the police battalion 320 shot down 23,600 local Jews in Kamyanyets-Podilskyi, while Jews were also deported from Hungary. At the time, it was the largest scale execution, while in the Holocaust historiography it is referred to as the one that marked the transition to the complete extermination of Jewish communities, not only some individual categories.⁸⁹ This evidently extended to the mass killings of about 250 Hungarian Jews in Orynyn.⁹⁰ On 30 August 1941, the same

87 For more, see: Eikel, Markus, and Valentina Sivaieva. "City Mayors, Rayon Chiefs and Village Elders in Ukraine", 1941-4: How Local Administrators Co-operated with the German Occupation Authorities". *Contemporary European History* 23, № 3 (2014): 420-423.

88 AUSBUKhO, f. 5, spr. 984, ark. 13, 18-18 rev.; *Ibid.*, spr. 20964, ark. 13 rev. -14; USC SFI VHA, # 15814, Ilya Kelmanovich.

89 For more, see: Mallmann, Klaus-Michael. "Der qualitative Sprung im Vernichtungsprozess: Das Massaker von Kamenez-Podolsk Ende August 1941". *Jahrbuch für Antisemitismusforschung* 10 (2001): 239-264; Pohl, Dieter. "Schauplatz Ukraine: Der Massenmord an den Juden im Militärverwaltungsgebiet und im Reichskommissariat 1941-1943". Hrsg. von Christian Hartmann, Johannes Hürter, Peter Lieb und Dieter Pohl. *Der deutsche Krieg im Osten 1941-1944: Facetten einer Grenzüberschreitung*. Oldenbourg: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 2009: 162-164. According to official reports, 4,200 Jews were killed on August 26; 11,000 on August 27; 7,000 on August, 28. The report dated August 30, 1941 specified that the total number of victims was 23,600 persons: Kruglov, Aleksandr. sost. *Sbornik dokumentov i materialov ob unichtozhenii natsistami evreyev Ukrainy v 1941-1944 godakh*. Kiyev: Institut iudaiki, 2002: 244-246.

90 According to the available report, it was obviously a consequence of activities of the same battalion 320 that on the same day it was busy studying the locality and preparing for action

battalion 320 killed 2,200 Jews in Mynkivtsi, and 380 more Jews on the next day in the villages of Velykyi Zhvanchyk and Sokilets.⁹¹ During the mass killings, the OUN(b) active core were displaced from the Kamyanets-Podilskyi region. It is indicative, though, that during the killings in Kamyanets-Podilskyi, Orynyn, Mynkivtsi, and Velykyi Zhvanchyk, the involvement of local collaborators was documented, mostly those who were serving in the police stations.⁹²

“No special order to exterminate the Jews was issued by the OUN Top Leaders”: Anti-Jewish Violence in Smotrych and Kupyn

The PPH members arriving in Kamyanets-Podilskyi region perceived an essential lack of people needed to carry out their activities, especially in rural areas. In order to reduce the load on the OUN(b) bodies that only were beginning to organize here, some districts of the Kamyanets-Podilskyi region, such as Yarmolyntsi, were even put under direct control of the neighbouring Ternopil region.⁹³ Moreover, in order to reinforce the PPH members with staff, there were plans to send OUN(b) activists recruited on the territory

around Kamyanets-Podilskyi: Kruglov. Sbornik dokumentov: 246.

91 Kruglov. Sbornik dokumentov: 247-248.
92 For Kamyanets-Podilskyi, see: AUSBUKhO, f. 5, spr. 984, ark. 18 rev., 35-35 rev.; Ibid., spr. 20964, ark. 16 rev., 17 rev. -18; Shvartsman, Moysey. “Sam ne znayu kak ya vyzhil...”. Zabarko. Zhivymi ostalis tolko my: 483-484; Tenneblat. “Ya ostalas sovershenno odna...”: 413; USC SFI VHA, # 15814, Ilya Kelmanovich; Ibid, # 30287, Anna Gutsol. For Orynyn, see: AUSBUKhO, f. 5, spr. 24211, ark. 15-16 rev., 29. For Mynkivtsi, see: AUSBUKhO, f. 5, spr. 959, ark. 29; Grupman, Iosif. “Minkovetskikh evreyev ubivali politsai”. Pomni! Vospominaniya o Kholokoste byvshikh uznikov natsistskikh getto i kontslagerey. Rekhovot: s.n., 2013: 92-93. On Velykyi Zhvanchyk, see: YVA, O.3/8658, Pavlina Barak-Birnbaum.

93 Dziuban. Ukrainske derzhavotvorennia: 328.

of Western Ukraine, mostly in the Ternopil region, too.⁹⁴ In July 1941, a large group of such activists arrived in Kamyanets-Podilskyi. It included the 27-year-old Volodymyr Balatsko, a teacher from Tovste district. In August 1948, he was arrested by Soviet special forces, and during interrogations he gave a detailed account of what he was doing in summer 1941, when appointed to the position of the OUN(b) district leader (*raionnyi providnyk*). Along with the other four subordinates, Ivan Lesiv, Dmytro Antoshkiv, Tymko Svnarchyn, and Oleksa Fedoryshyn, he left for the district center of Smotrych, northwards from Kamyanets-Podilskyi. Upon arrival, they convened a meeting of local people and established a district administration office, and a squad of “Sich” fighters headed by Kostiantyn Tsikhotskyi. The squad also registered two new arrivals, Svnarchyn and Fedoryshyn. Instead, Lesiv and Antoshkiv became propagandists with the assignment to organize local government in rural areas of the Smotrych district.⁹⁵ After some time, the OUN(b) regional headman Kozak informed Balatsko on the escalation of conflict with the Nazi occupation administration and the start of arrests of Ukrainian nationalists. After this, he started paying more attention to developing a covert network of OUN(b) and engaging local citizens for this purpose. The contact with them was established with the password “Tempest” – “Hurricane.”⁹⁶ Under such conditions, their activities in Smotrych lasted for about a month.

In the end of July 1941, Balatsko returned to Smotrych after a trip to rural areas and found in the town a combat group (*boivka*) of SB OUN(b) made up of five persons. A

94 Ibid., 225.

95 AUSBUTO, f. 5, spr. 6980, ark. 58-59.

96 Ibid., ark. 61-64, 70-72.

commander of the combat group introduced himself as a “Strila” and declared that while he was away he took the liberty “to manage things for a while,” that is to commit a Jewish pogrom by killing several persons.

*The ‘Strila’ told me, - Balatsko testified, - that he, as head of the combat group [of SB] of the Skalat county administration of the OUN was specially designated to come to the eastern regions of Ukraine to engage in activities to exterminate the Jews as propagators of Communist ideas.*⁹⁷

On the next day, the combat group members of SB, along with the local “Sich” fighters committed another pogrom.⁹⁸ During interrogations, Balatsko did not provide information about the methods used. However, the events could be reconstructed in detail due to other sources. According to them, the detained Jews were convoyed to the suburbs of the town, to the Smotrych river, where they were put in two lines – one with old people and men, and another one with women and children. According to some data, they were first forced to graze on the shore, and then they were told to cross the river. Those who were able to were told they could go back home. People started making a row cry that was heard even in Smotrych. After that, they were fired upon. Some people managed to escape, while others were shot down or drowned.⁹⁹ In addition to

Ukrainian nationalists, eye-witnesses also mentioned other participants in the pogrom, such as “Sich” fighters Tsikhotskyi, Oleksiy Batiukevych, Hryhoriy Hrebeliuk, and Fedir Nebesnyi. We managed to identify in the Archive of the Security Service of Ukraine in Khmelnytskyi Region files on criminal cases for two of them – Batiukevych and Hrebeliuk. None of them admitted their involvement in the mass killings on the Smotrych river, even though eye-witnesses insisted on this in both cases. Hrebeliuk even swore that the killings were executed only by Ukrainian nationalists.¹⁰⁰

While the descriptions of circumstances of the mass killings coincide in all available sources, the number of victims is not consistent therein. During interrogations, Balatsko mentioned the numbers of 80 or 100 persons.¹⁰¹ The number 100 persons was also mentioned by the eye-witness Mykola Osadchuk.¹⁰² In later accounts, he mentioned that several hundred persons were convoyed to the river, and ‘dozens of dead bodies’ were later floating on it.¹⁰³ Raissa Bidna testified in 1947 that 20 persons were forced into the river, and 10 of them were killed, but in 1960, she mentioned 100 and 15 persons respectively.¹⁰⁴ Basia Bohomolets (Perepletchikova) reported 20 casualties.¹⁰⁵ There were also injured persons.¹⁰⁶ All bodies were collected by local people, loaded onto carts, taken to a Jewish cemetery, and buried in a mass grave.¹⁰⁷

97 AUSBUTO, f. 5, spr. 6980, ark. 65 rev. - 66 rev.

98 Ibid., 66 rev.

99 Quoted based on: AUSBUTO, f. 5, spr. 6980, ark. 159 rev., 161; AUSBUKhO, f. 5, spr. 837, ark. 63, 88; Ibid., spr. 2544, ark. 25 rev. -26, 29 rev. -30, 34; Shymanskyi, I. red. Knyha skorboty Ukrainy: Khmelnytska oblast. vol. 1. Khmelnytskyi: Podillia, 2003: 313; YVA, O.48/273.25, Semyon Faingold; Yahad-In Unum Archive (hereinafter – YIUA), # 659; Ibid., # 651; USC SFI VHA, # 27156, Basia Perepletchikova.

100 AUSBUKhO, f. 5, spr. 837, ark. 63 rev., 88, 116 rev., 143 rev. -144.

101 AUSBUTO, f. 5, spr 6980, ark. 15, 66 rev., 67.

102 Ibid., ark. 161.

103 Shymanskyi. Knyha skorboty Ukrainy: 313.

104 AUSBUKhO, f. 5, spr. 837, ark. 88, 210-211.

105 USC SFI VHA, # 27156, Basia Perepletchikova.

106 YIUA, # 659.

107 Shymanskyi. Knyha skorboty Ukrainy: 313; YIUA, # 651.

For several days after the mass killing, the Bohomolets family hid in the house of their acquaintance Nestor Kiyovskyi. When she returned home, Bohomolets had a talk with Ukrainian nationalists who claimed the following about the mass killings: "It was not us. It was the others."¹⁰⁸ Balatsko also stated during interrogations that all of it was committed without any permission on his part.

*Since I personally never received any orders on organizing any Jewish pogroms, – he testified, – on the next day I left for the city of Kamyanets-Podilskyi to meet the leader Kozak. He answered my question by stating that there were no special orders from the OUN Leadership to exterminate the Jews and that the issue of exterminating the Jewish population was within the authority of the Germans who actually committed the killings. The OUN only allowed the killing of Jews in cases when they acted against the OUN or committed sabotage of the organization's ongoing activities.*¹⁰⁹

In fact, Kozak forwarded the message of the guidelines "Struggle and Activities of the OUN in Wartime" mentioned above that he undoubtedly should have been aware as a member of the PPH. Kozak ordered Balatsko to immediately return to Smotrych and to send to him the "Strila." But he was not available any longer. Along with his combat group, he was transferred to another district. Due to the abovementioned events, Balatsko arranged with the director of the sugar factory in the town of Vyshnivchyk (Smotrych district), Fedir Symko, whom he enrolled as a OUN(b) member, and with the head of the Judenrat in Smotrych, Tsukerman, to send local Jews to the sugar factory. According to him, they were

¹⁰⁸ USC SFI VHA, # 27156, Basia Perepletkhova.

¹⁰⁹ AUSBUTO, f. 5, spr. 6980, ark. 66 rev. -67.

still staying there in August 1941.¹¹⁰

In the beginning of August 1941, Balatsko sent a group of "Sich" fighters to the town of Kupyn, Smotrych district, to proclaim the Ukrainian state therein. Upon their return, Fedoryshyn recounted that one of the local Jews called him obscene names. Fedoryshyn then fired at him in response and wounded him in the neck.

*Since the group I sent came back after failing to fulfil the assignment. [explained Balatsko] I asked about the reason why it failed. I was told that the Jews who lived in the town of Kupyn resisted the ongoing activities.*¹¹¹

He gathered an even larger group of "Sich" fighters, and left for Kupyn. They were also joined by a Melnyk who had recently come to Smotrych with a yellow and blue armband and the documents for the position of gardening inspector of the Kamyanets-Podilskyi regional administration. He called himself an "authorized operative."¹¹² Further events were described by Balatsko as follows:

First, we wanted to search for the Jewish person who was wounded by Fedoryshyn but he disappeared. After that, we committed a Jewish pogrom. A recently arrived Melnyk played an active role in the pogrom. He used to live in the town of Kupyn and was well aware of the location and addresses of the Jews. During the pogrom, about fifty persons

¹¹⁰ Ibid., ark. 67. Symko was executed in March 1943, along with all of his family.: D. Kys. [Kyslytsia, Dmytro]. "Pryiazn mizh Kovpakom i E. Kokhom. Z podii 1943 roku na Podilli". Na Storozhi, № 3-4 (1948): 14.

¹¹¹ AUSBUTO, f. 5, spr. 6980, ark. 67-67 rev.

¹¹² It is most probably about Leontiy Melnyk from Kupyn who was referred to by the fellow villagers as a "Ukrainian nationalist": AUSBUKhO, f. 5, spr. 22744, ark. 88 rev.; Ibid., spr. 23683, ark. 44, 47 rev., 52 rev., 59.

*of Jewish origin were gathered, who were further forced into the river and fired at.*¹¹³

Among participants of the mass killing, he mentioned the “Sich” fighters Antoshkiv, Fedoryshyn, Tsikhotskyi, Nebesnyi, Stakh Vitkovskiy, Zayets, a.o.¹¹⁴

Just like with the mass killings in Smotrych, Balatsko mentioned different numbers of casualties in Kupyn during interrogations, reporting either 10 or 50 persons. He admitted that the exact number of murdered persons could not be known to him, since it all took place in the evening and it was dark outside.¹¹⁵ Criminal cases for the “Sich” fighters from Kupyn that we managed to identify in the Khmelnytskyi SBU Archive do not offer any reasonable grounds to specify the circumstances of the events. The documents confirm the arrival in the town of a group of Ukrainian nationalists and Smotrych “Sich” fighters in the beginning of August 1941. A witness claimed they detained a group of Kupyn Komsomol members and Jews, who were forced to the river and victimized there.¹¹⁶ The facts about the nature of victimization as well as the number of persons killed as a result cannot be found in the available evidence. Only the murders of a Jewish man Zeide and Komsomol members Ivan Varshavskiy and Kazymyr Vyshnevskiy are mentioned.¹¹⁷

On the whole, Balatsko most probably regarded his actions as the punishment of Kupyn Jews for “sabotaging the activities of the organization,” in compliance with the orders received from Kozak. It was fully in line

with the principle of collective responsibility that the OUN(b) was publicly declaring at the time.¹¹⁸ At the same time, it is doubtful that the Kupyn Jews could actually manifest any resistance at all, and whether the case recounted by Fedoryshyn took place at all. It is known that at that time, in Kupyn, local authorities had been created, which also included a squad of “Sich” headed by Anton Bobrovskiy.¹¹⁹ Under such circumstances, the Jewish community could hardly be an actual part of the local community.

It is also notable that in both Smotrych and Kupyn, mass killings were committed in a similar manner – Jews were forced to the river where some of them drowned and others were shot down. In the many centuries of history of anti-Jewish violence, such cases were first related to forced baptisms, or rather punishment for rejecting to do so.¹²⁰ On the territory of the present day Ukraine, the cases of drowning of Jews were first clearly documented during the Cossack unrest of the 17th century.¹²¹ However, most evidence comes from the period of mass pogroms starting in 1918 and lasting into the 1920s. Such cases are often related to pogrom activities of the

118 The orders disseminated since the beginning of July 1941 by the Land leader of OUN(b), Klymiv, introduced the notion of “collective responsibility (by family and by ethnicity) for all offenses to the Ukrainian Army and Ukrainian state”: Dziuban. *Ukrainske derzhavotvorennia*: 131.

119 AUSBUKhO, f. 5, spr. 2297, ark. 17-17 rev.; *Ibid.*, spr. 23683, ark. 44-44 rev., 51 rev.

120 Klier, John Doyle. “The Pogrom Paradigm in Russian History”. Ed. by John Doyle Klier and Shlomo Lambroza. *Pogroms: Anti-Jewish Violence in Modern Russian History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992: 13.

121 Yakovenko, Nataliia Red. *Hlybokiy mul. Khronika Natana Hanovera*. Kyiv: Dukh i litera, 2010: 102; Sukhykh, Lidiia and Viktor Strashko, upor. *Natsionalno-vyzvolna viina v Ukraini 1648-1657. Zbirnyk za dokumentamy aktovykh knykh*. Kyiv: Derzhavnyi komitet arkhiviv Ukrainy; TsDIAK, 2008: 123-124; Spector and Wigoder. *The Encyclopedia of Jewish Life*. Vol. II: 667.

113 AUSBUTO, f. 5, spr. 6980, ark. 67 rev.

114 *Ibid.*, ark. 22 rev. -23, 72 rev., 74.

115 *Ibid.*, ark. 15, 22 rev., 67 rev.

116 AUSBUKhO, f. 5, spr. 22744, ark. 88 rev.

117 *Ibid.*, spr. 2297, ark. 17 rev. -18; *Ibid.*, spr. 22744, ark. 41 rev., 87, 88 rev. -89, 118 rev. -120; *Ibid.*, spr. 23683, ark. 45.

insurgent headman Ilko Struk, for example the several days of violence committed by his subordinates in spring 1919 in the town of Chornobyl. In fact, the expression “to the river” was increasingly understood by the Jews as the threat of imminent death.¹²² During anti-Jewish massacres in summer 1941, cases of mass killings by drowning were not uncommon. They are recorded on quite a large territory, including East Galicia, Northern Bukovina, and Volhynian Polissia as well.¹²³ Jews were forced to graze like cattle during the pogrom in the town of Olevsk.¹²⁴ Such attempts to humiliate victims as much as possible and to dehumanize them to animals were fully in line with the position of the perpetrators as they could regard their actions as a sort of “revenge” for their own suffering, real or alleged, from the Soviet regime that was associated with the Jews. According to one of the witnesses, local “Sich” fighters tried to stage overexaggerated theatrical anti-Jewish violence in Smotrych before the mass killing. Once they rounded up older Jews and made them sing the song “If the war comes

tomorrow...” from a Soviet film with the same name. Afterwards Batiukevych mocked them: “Not all the Soviet people would take a stand, but all the Jews people would stand for the freedom of the homeland.”¹²⁵

Anti-Jewish violence in Smotrych and Kupyn resulted from a number of factors. The fast advance of the German troops at the start of war created a certain power vacuum. The active core of the OUN(b) took this opportunity to spread their influence to the previously inaccessible areas, trying to take control over establishing local authorities and determining their further functioning. The local population would also often ask for help from Ukrainian nationalists in various ways since they were disoriented due to the new reality of the occupation regime.¹²⁶ Even after the start of the conflict with the Nazi occupation administration, they managed to legally operate for some time in rural areas far away from big cities. The fact that in parallel they continued to persecute local Jews implies they were also implementing their own policies not related to the Holocaust policy or trying to win some trust from the Germans to this end.¹²⁷ Moreover, none of the available testimonies have any records on the participation or presence of the Nazi occupation administration during mass killings in Smotrych and Kupyn. That is why the events also should be considered in the context of the planned violence against ethnic minorities OUN(b) contrived back in spring 1941. Despite the fact that pogroms as a method

122 Milyakova, Lidiya. red. *Kniga pogromov. Pogromy na Ukraine, v Belorussii i evropeyskoy chasti Rossii v period Grazhdanskoy voyny, 1918-1922 gg. Sbornik dokumentov.* Moskva: ROSSPEN, 2007: 95-98, 100, 102, 110-111. More about Struk, see: Gilley, Christopher. “The Ukrainian Anti-Bolshevik Risings of Spring and Summer 1919: Intellectual History in a Space of Violence.” *Revolutionary Russia* 27, № 2 (2014): 109-131.

123 Razenblat, Jawgjen. “Stawljen’nje pol’skaga i bjelaruskaga nasjel’nictva da gabrejaw na Paljes’i w pjershyja tydni pas’lja napadu Njamjehchynny na Savjecki Sajuz”. *ARCHE*, № 5 (2010): 568-569; Kruglov, Umanskiy i Shchupak. *Kholokost v Ukraine*: 111; Spector and Wigoder. *The Encyclopedia of Jewish Life*. Vol. I: 557, 570; Struve. *Deutsche Herrschaft*: 654-661. On similar cases after summer 1941, see: Spector and Wigoder. *The Encyclopedia of Jewish Life*. Vol. II: 591, 850, 1058.

124 McBride, Jared. “Ukrainian Holocaust Perpetrators Are Being Honored in Place of Their Victims.” *Tablet*. June 20, 2016. <http://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-news-and-politics/208439/holocaust-perpetrators-honored>

125 AUSBUKHO, f. 5, spr. 2544, ark. 29-29 rev. See also: Shymanskyi. *Knyha skorboty Ukrainy*: 313.

126 *Ibid.*, spr. 6980, ark. 65 rev.; USC SFI VHA, # 27156, Basia Perepletchikova.

127 Such an explanation of the involvement of OUN(b) activists in carrying out the Jewish pogrom in Lviv in the beginning of July 1941 is offered by John Paul Himka: Himka. “The Lviv Pogrom”: 234.

were not stipulated, the ambiguous wording of the policy documents and guidelines of the OUN(b) regarding “fighting”, “cleansing”, “liquidation” could be treated differently by the lower level leaders. This was even more the case when they were followed by anti-Semitic propaganda and the approval of the principle of collective responsibility. That is why, considering the conditions of the summer 1941, there were people among Ukrainian nationalists who were both ready to kill all Jews without exception and opponents of such methods. It is obvious that both were acting in line with the guidelines received from above. In his analysis of the developments of “Ukrainian National State-Building”, the author pen-named “M. Homin,” wrote about them rather critically in summer of 1942. Among other things, he complained about the following:

*With regard to Jews, we had had a rather clear obliging principle long before the war that we treat them quite inimically, but do not engage in any pogroms. However, there were still cases when some politically immature Ukrainian elements let themselves become involved in pogrom operations.*¹²⁸

It is clear that those persons who were hastily recruited, just like Balatsko, on the territory of Western Ukraine and sent to the Kamyanyets-Podilskyi region did not have any special training such as that of PPH members. Their background was limited to briefings only.¹²⁹ Therefore, many things depended on their

own backgrounds, skills, or even intuition. As for Balatsko, it is known that he became involved with the nationalist ideas back in his teen years. In 1930, he became a member of the Youth Section of the OUN. In 1934, he was sentenced to 18 months in prison for that. Afterwards, Balatsko resumed his cooperation with Ukrainian nationalists for a short time until he definitively took an oath in July 1941 and became an OUN(b) member, nicknamed “Lulka” (Smoking Pipe).¹³⁰ In the 1930s, he read the underground magazines “Bulletin of the OUN Land Leadership” (“*Biuletyn Kraiivoi Ekzekutyvy OUN*”), “Surma”, and “Nation Development” (“*Rozbudova Natsii*”); “Nationalism” by Dmytro Dontsov, “Kholodnyi Yar” (Cold Ravine) by Yuriy Horlis-Horskyi, etc.¹³¹ The experience must have shaped a major argument when he was granted the position of district leader of the OUN(b) in July 1941 in Kamyanyets-Podilskyi. Hardly anything is known about the other persons arriving along with him. At least one of them, Antoshkiv, had been a OUN(b) member since 1940.¹³² The fact that they had been actively involved in the organization’s activities in the period of the greatest radicalization towards the Jewish minority could effect their own convictions. Bohomolets recounted that Ukrainian nationalists spread anti-Semitic propaganda in Smotrych.¹³³ In addition, other persons, who were not OUN(b) members, were also sent to the Kamyanyets-

128 HDA SBU, f. 13, spr. 372, t. 24, ark. 114.

129 AUSBUTO, f. 5, spr. 6980, ark. 20, 50 rev. -51; See also testimonies by Osy Havryliuk who arrived to Kamyanyets-Podilskyi in the same group with Balatsko and was further sent as a district leader of the OUN(b) to the town of Stara Ushytsia: AUSBUTO, f. 6, spr. 10634-P, ark. 16-16 rev., 26 rev. -27, 41; Havryliuk. “*Ne skuie dushi zhyvovi...*”: 87.

130 AUSBUTO, f. 5, spr. 6980, ark. 14 rev., 16 rev. - 19 rev., 30-45. For the arrest and court hearing for the Balatsko case, see also: Dilo, № 346 (1933): 4; Ibid., № 35 (1934): 7; Mirchuk, Petro. *Narys istorii Orhanizatsii Ukrainykykh Natsionalistiv*. vol. 1. Munich; London; New York: Ukrainske Vydavnytstvo, 1968: 416, 421.

131 Ibid., ark. 31-31 rev., 39 rev. - 40; Dilo, № 35 (1934): 7.

132 AUSBUTO, f. 5, spr. 6980, ark. 170.

133 USC SFI VHA, # 27156, Basia Perepletchikova.

Podilskyi region. Their task was to serve in the "Sich" only. Among the Balatsko subordinates, this included Fedoryshyn.¹³⁴

We failed to identify whether anyone of them had already been involved in anti-Jewish violence in Western Ukraine. Balatsko testified that he was aware of the killings of Jews by OUN(b) activists in the villages of Anhelivka and Tsapivka of the Tovste district.¹³⁵ Similar events took place in the nearby settlements. By contrast, in the district center of Tovste, the pogrom was prevented by a group of local activists, among them Ukrainian nationalist Stepan Andrushchyshyn.¹³⁶ Despite such cases, it was more common for this period to witness the brutalization of methods and activities and to take revenge on everyone identified as enemies. For instance, at interrogations, Balatsko repeated the words Kateryna Liakhovetska - "Halychanka" told him. She was one of the members of the combat group of SB under "Strila": "Liakhovetska boasted to me that despite being a woman she was able to kill a person who turned out to be her personal enemy or an enemy of her nation."¹³⁷

However, it would be naive to believe that the activities of Ukrainian nationalists were only motivated by ideological reasons. The available testimonies prove that they were also actively pillaging Jewish property and were supposedly sending it back home to Western Ukraine.¹³⁸ As for Balatsko, one of

the witnesses informed that he arrived to Smotrych wearing plain peasant clothes, but soon after he possessed many suits plundered from the Jews.¹³⁹ It is notable that in the report of the OUN(b) underground on the situation in Kamyanets-Podilskyi region dated August 1942, the results of activities of Ukrainian nationalists in summer 1941 were quite criticized. In particular, they were reproached for the lack of the due staff:

*There were many small men who were going to the eastern region in search of gains. That is why we carried out different kinds of disgraceful robberies, executions, arrests, and the like there. It is obvious that all of that had an impact on the local population.*¹⁴⁰

The regional headman of OUN(b), Kozak, back in July 1941, complained about his predecessor Zbrozhyk, who later became a regional commander of police, claiming he was a kind of person who "was not merely fond of dressing up exotically, but pulling clothes together from everywhere."¹⁴¹

The material component of anti-Jewish violence was also an important motivation for the local population of Smotrych and Kupyn to become involved in the first place, in particular the "Sich" fighters. Balatsko talked about Tsikhotskyi and Nebesnyi as those who were most actively involved in robberies. They even ignored his warnings against doing so.¹⁴²

On the whole, they tried to enroll the anti-Soviet local citizens into the "Sich." Therefore, it is not surprising that the "Sich" fighters would publicly claim that they had

134 AUSBUTI, f. 5, spr. 6980, ark. 50 rev. -51, 52.

135 Ibid., ark. 47-48 rev.

136 See more at: Struve. *Deutsche Herrschaft: 554-555*; Zbikowski, Andrzej. "Anti-Jewish Pogroms in Occupied Territories of Eastern Poland, June-July 1941." Ed. by Lucjan Dobroszycki and Jeffrey S. Gurock. *The Holocaust in the Soviet Union: Studies and Sources on the Destruction of the Jews in the Nazi-Occupied Territories of the USSR, 1941-1945*. Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1993: 179. For Andrushchyshyn, see: Klymenko and Tkachov. *Ukrainci v politsii*: 66.

137 AUSBUTO, f. 5, spr. 6980, ark. 76.

138 AUSBUKhO, f. 5, spr. 2544, ark. 16.

139 AUSBUTO, f. 5, spr. 6980, ark. 67, 155 rev. -156, 159 rev.

140 Dziuban. *Ukrainske derzhavotvorenna*: 451-452, 454.

141 TsDAVOV, f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 14, ark. 13.

142 AUSBUTO, f. 5, spr. 6980, ark. 72 rev., 74.

awaited the arrival of German troops for many years, that they had disseminated anti-Soviet literature, and even committed sabotage such as poisoning horses from collective farms.¹⁴³ However, it is unknown how truthful their statements were. It is probable that in most cases they were just saying something that was most beneficial for them under the current circumstances. In fact, their biographies appear more complicated and controversial. For instance, Tsikhotskyi told that he used to study in the Youth School of the Ukrainian People's Republic Army in Kamyianets-Podilskyi, was persecuted by Soviet secret units, but at the same time was cautious to speak out about his past to the Germans. In order to save himself, he reportedly gave away his own father who was banished to Siberia.¹⁴⁴ Nebesnyi told about being involved with the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine (*Spilka vyzvolennia Ukrainy – SVU*). Before the war, he worked as a carpenter in the NKVD in the Drohobych region. "He seems to be a smart and clever person, - Balatsko described him, - he was always happy about everything, always satisfied with everything."¹⁴⁵ It is obvious that he realized the frequent hypocrisy of such revelations. That is why he had not accepted any of the mentioned persons as OUN(b) members. After all, his influence on local "Sich" fighters was rather nominal. As soon as they stopped seeing him as a representative of occupation authorities, as they believed

before, they stopped obeying him. When Balatsko left Smotrych at risk of arrest in August 1941, Tsikhotskyi and the group of other "Sich" fighters tried to stop him and hand him over to the Germans.¹⁴⁶ With respect to local combatants involved in anti-Jewish violence, it is important to understand that some of them had anti-Soviet attitudes closely followed by open anti-Semitic attitudes. One of the fellow villagers told about the former "Sich" commander Bobrovskyi from Kupyn:

*At roughly every meeting, Bobrovskyi would intimidate residents of our village with the threat of Red Terror. He would say that when Soviet rule comes to Ukraine the Jews would abuse and mistreat Ukrainian people again.*¹⁴⁷

Batiukevych was also described in the same vein. At the same time, before the war he used to live nearby the Jewish families and was on good terms with them.¹⁴⁸

It is obvious that the range of motivations of immediate perpetrators of mass killings in Smotrych and Kupyn was quite wide. There were certain differences between the newcoming Ukrainian nationalists and their local assistants, for example in terms of ideological or political convictions. Nonetheless, they shared the urge to benefit from the Jewish possessions. Both of them actively indulged in such opportunities.

The radicalization of the OUN(b) towards the Jewish community culminating in 1940/41 resulted in plans to be implemented upon the start of the war between the Third Reich

143 YVA, O.48/273.25, Semyon Faingold.

144 AUSBUTO, f. 5, spr. 6980, ark. 72-73.

145 Ibid., ark. 74. Balatsko was also informed by other persons about their belonging to or connections with the SVU. Current research proves that no such organization existed. It was invented by Soviet secret services as the basis for repressions of prospective opponents of the regime: Prokopchuk, Viktor. "Kamianets-Podil'ska filia 'Spilky vyzvolennia Ukrainy': do istorii falsyfikatsii». *Z arkhiviv VUCHK-HPU-NKVD-KHB*, № 1-2 (2013): 126-145.

146 AUSBUTO, f. 5, spr. 6980, ark. 72. Eventually, Tsikhotskyi was executed along with his family, in December, 1942.: AUSBUKhO, f. 5, spr. 837, ark. 15, 30 rev.; Shymanskyi. *Knyha skorboty Ukrainy*: 356.

147 AUSBUKhO, f. 5, spr. 2297, ark. 22 rev.

148 Ibid., spr. 2544, ark. 16, 25 rev., 33 rev.

and the Soviet Union. The plans stipulated mass violence against the ethnic minorities recognized to be potentially disloyal, including the Jews. The marching groups of OUN(b) who were commissioned to spread the influence of Ukrainian nationalism in the earlier inaccessible regions of Ukraine directly were involved in violent acts. Local citizens also played an important role there. The context of the pogroms in Smotrych and Kupyn in July-August 1941 was slightly different than what research analyses reveal about similar cases in Western Ukraine. Here, they were neither directly preceded by mass killings of prisoners committed by the NKVD nor inspired by Germans. It goes beyond any doubt that the OUN(b) activists were organizers of the two pogroms, which is also confirmed by the use of the same method of mass execution. Further research on similar cases taking place beyond Western Ukraine could add more insights

to the currently available approaches to the causes and nature of anti-Jewish violence in the first months of the Nazi occupation.

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