KGB Special Operations, Cultural Consumption, and the Youth Culture in Soviet Ukraine, 1968–1985

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> A retired Ukrainian KGB officer has recently noted that "since 1945 until the collapse of the USSR, capitalist America was the main real adversary of the Soviet leadership and the KGB. But after the opening of Soviet Ukraine to various Western influences under Khrushchev, and especially under Brezhnev, this adversary, the U.S.A., created a new front inside Soviet society, affecting the Soviet youth culture. After 1945, enduring Ukrainian nationalism, Zionism, and religious sects became traditional targets of KGB operations in Soviet Ukraine. Since 1968, after the massive participation of Czech youth, influenced by American imperialist propaganda, in the events of the Prague Spring, a new object had emerged for KGB active measures and special operations. This object was Soviet Ukrainian youth culture, which was shaped by alien Western, especially American, influences.[1]

> The author's interview with Stepan Ivanovich T., a retired KGB officer, 30 January 2019, Kyiv, Ukraine

This study explores KGB active measures and special operations against Americanization/ Westernization of Soviet youth culture which is analyzed here through the prism of cultural consumption in Soviet Ukraine. The first persecutions of "mass alien" groupings of college students who imitated American hippies in 1968 and campaigns against high school student neo-Nazi punks during the Andropov era is the focal point of this archival research. Through an analysis of declassified KGB documents, this study adds depth to prior attempts to analyze KGB operations targeting the youth culture in Soviet Ukraine during late socialism.[2]

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[1] Stepan Ivanovich referred to "active measures" that were defined by Vladimir Bukovsky as "[a]ctions of political warfare conducted by the Soviet and Russian security services (Cheka, OGPU, NKVD, KGB, FSB) ranging from media manipulation to outright violence." See Vladimir Bukovsky, *Judgment in Moscow: Soviet Crimes and Western Complicity*, trans. Alyona Kojevnikov (Westlake Village, CA: Ninth of November Press, 2019), 629.

[2] I refer to the pioneering study by William Jay Risch, "Soviet 'Flower Children': Hippies and the Youth Counter-Culture in 1970s Lviv," *Journal of Contemporary History* 40, no. 3 (2005): 565–84, and his book, *The Ukrainian West: Culture and the Fate of Empire in Soviet Lviv* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), esp. 237–44. Juliane Fürst is writing now a book about Soviet hippies. See her recent publications: "We All Live in a Yellow Submarine: Life in a Leningrad Commune," in *Dropping out of Socialism: The Creation of Alternative Spheres in the Soviet Bloc*, eds. Juliane Fürst and Josie McLellan (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2016), 197–207; and "If You're Going to Moscow, Be Sure to Wear Some Flowers In Your Hair: The Soviet Hippie Sistema and Its Life In, Despite and With Stagnation," in *Reconsidering Stagnation in the Brezhnev Era*, eds. Dina Fainberg and Artemy Kalinovsky (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2016), 123–46. On some aspects of Soviet youth culture, see Gleb Tsipursky, *Socialist Fun: Youth, Consumption, and State-Sponsored Popular Culture in the Soviet Union, 1945–1970* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2016) and Sergei I. Zhuk, *Rock and Roll in the Rocket City: The West, Identity, and Ideology in Soviet Dnieopropetrovsk, 1960–1985* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press & Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2010). For these publications, the authors (including myself) did not use KGB documents from the SBU Archive in Kyiv.

After the Second World War, the Soviet political police and major intelligence agency, the KGB, targeted the United States of America as the "main enemy in the world" for the USSR.[3] By late 1947, under Stalin, the United States, former major Soviet political ally in the war against Nazi Germany, had gradually become a main political and ideological enemy of the Soviet Union.[4] In this new geopolitical confrontation, the most important domestic target of the KGB was Ukrainian nationalism, which was believed to be connected to and funded by Americans. According to KGB archival documents, from 1953 until 1991, approximately 50% of all criminal cases focused on "dangerous" Ukrainian nationalists. The second most important target of the KGB in Ukraine was another type of nationalism, Judaism and Zionism (which comprised more than 30% of all criminal cases). Religious sects were identified as the third threat for the USSR (10%). The remaining 10% was allotted to American espionage and foreign visitors as agents of Western intelligence. As the head of Ukraine's KGB, a general-major Vitalii Nikitchenko, noted, on 12 March 1954, "the major threat for Soviet Ukraine consist[ed] of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists, Zionists, and religious sectarians, – all of them [were] funded and organized by intelligence services of the United States and England."[5]

In 1968, thirteen years later, KGB officials expanded the scope of their special operations in Soviet Ukraine. Besides the perpetrators of Ukrainian nationalism, Jewish Zionism, and religious sects, the KGB concentrated on the problems of youth culture and American influences which, in the KGB's view, were associated with the old issues of dissident activities in Soviet society. Targeting Western influences on Soviet youth, KGB operations became an important part of active measures.

These KGB activities began during the World Youth Festival in 1957 in Moscow, when Soviet youth were exposed to contact with Western guests. As early as June 1956, Ukraine's KGB ordered the formation and special training of a group of special operatives, undercover KGB agents, to be sent to the World Youth Festival in 1957 in Moscow as official members of the delegation from Soviet Ukraine. According to official lists, composed by the KGB in Kyiv, more than 60 % of the representatives of Soviet Ukrainian youth in Moscow were undercover KGB agents.[6]

The events of the Prague Spring of 1968, which involved the mass participation of Czechoslovak youth, contributed to the KGB's anxieties about political and ideological stability in the USSR. On 21 March 1968, during the CPSU Politburo meeting in Moscow, the Ukrainian Communist Party leader Petro Shelest, frightened of "American dangerous ideological influences" being spread from Czechoslovakia to Ukraine and to the "entire socialist camp," proposed to suppress those developments immediately. Supported by Yuri Andropov, the KGB's new head, Shelest emphasized that, although it was "essential to seek out the healthy (pro-

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[3] According to Christopher Andrew, "throughout the Cold War, Soviet intelligence regarded the United States as its 'main adversary.' In second place at the beginning of the Cold War was the United States' closest ally, the United Kingdom. In third position came France." See in Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, *The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB* (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 150.

[4] On the transformation of the United States' image under Stalin and Khrushchev, see Rósa Magnúsdóttir, *Enemy Number One: The United States of America in Soviet Ideology and Propaganda, 1945–1959* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), esp. 73, 151.

[5] Haluzevyi Derzhavnyi Arkhiv Sluzhby Bezpeky Ukrainy (hereafter: HDA SBU), f. 16, op. 1, spr. 902, ark. 35, 142. Unless otherwise stated, all excerpts from archival documents have been translated by the author from Russian into English. Compare with the original: "Главную угрозу советской Украине представляют украинские буржуазные националисты, сионисты и сектанты – все на службе и финансовой поддержке разведок США и Англии."

[6] HDA SBU, f. 16, op. 1, spr. 919, ark. 60–61.

Soviet) forces in Czechoslovakia more actively," immediate "military measures" there would also be necessary. This was especially important for prevention of similar developments elsewhere, especially in Soviet Ukraine.[7]

As a result, Ukraine's KGB directed its efforts on special operations against its main enemy, capitalist America, and its influences on young Ukrainians. In the 1970s, Ukrainian nationalism in both capitalist America and socialist Ukraine was still a major concern of KGB operatives (20% of all cases). Jewish nationalism/Zionism followed suit (20%). Various Christian sects continued to be a serious problem for the KGB in Ukraine (20%). A rising problem was Crimean Tatar nationalism/Muslim activism (10%). Western intelligence in various forms, including espionage, was among the aforementioned targets of the Ukrainian KGB leadership (10%). Perceived as the United States' creation and inspiration, the Helsinki Accords of 1975 and the Soviet human rights movement posed a new threat for the KGB. A special KGB operation codenamed "BLOK" was designed to curtail the political activism of Ukrainian intellectuals, constituting approximately 10% of the KGB's counterintelligence operations.[8] Finally, a new and serious problem for the KGB campaigns, "the threat of westernization" of Soviet youth, constituted the major focus of approximately 10% of all criminal and "prophylactic" cases in the 1970s, and nearly 20% of all cases in the 1980s.[9] KGB analysts realized that "capitalist America" became not only the main, but also the "seductive adversary," creating political forms, cultural products, and practices, attractive for young Soviet consumers.[10]

The KGB, College Students, and Soviet Hippies

While observing the events in Czechoslovakia in 1967–1968, KGB officials emphasized the active involvement of Czechoslovak youth and college students in the Prague Spring.[11] In this context, KGB analysts realized an urgent necessity to seriously investigate various youth social groups in the Soviet Union. According to former KGB officers and archival documents, the most volatile, ideologically unreliable, and susceptible to Western (especially American) influences was the group of college students,[12] a notion that was consistent with the Czech trends of 1967–1968. As early as May 1967, immediately after Yuri Andropov was appointed the head of the KGB, the intelligence analysts initiated a series of research projects to study various Soviet college student groups. The KGB realized that the official sociological data provided by Komsomol ideologists and researchers from various departments of social sciences and

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[7] Rudolf Pihoia, "Chekhoslovakia 1968 god (Part 1)," *Novaia i noveishaia istoriia*, no. 6 (1994): 24–28. See also Mark Kramer, ed., "Ukraine and the Soviet-Czechoslovak Crisis of 1968 (Part I): New Evidence from the Diary of Petro Shelest," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, no. 10 (1998): 234–47; Andrew and Mitrokhin, *The Sword and the Shield*, 251.

[8] Vitalii K. Vrublevskii, *Vladimir Shcherbitskii: zapiski pomoshchnika: slukhi, legendy, dokumenty* (Kyiv: Dovira, 1993), 167–68.

[9] It is based on my calculations of criminal cases from 1971 (HDA SBU, f. 16, op. 1, spr. 1017) to 1989 (spr. 1271). An analysis of various official KGB reports to Ukraine's Communist Party leadership has confirmed the preliminary calculations (spr. 1056, ark. 1–311; spr. 1115, ark. 5–310; spr. 1115, ark. 25–301; spr. 1209, ark. 25–290).

[10] HDA SBU, f. 16, op. 1, spr. 1249, ark. 147–49. On the Soviet youth's fascination with American jazz and rock music as early as September 1964, see especially the September 1964 KGB report in HDA SBU, f. 1, op. 1, spr. 1567, ark. 151–52.

[11] See the material about the KGB operations and Prague Spring in Andrew and Mitrokhin, *The Sword and the Shield*, 247–61.

[12] The author's interview with Ihor T., a KGB officer, 15 May 1991, Dnipropetrovsk, Ukraine.

humanities in Soviet universities (i.e., History of the Communist Party, Marxist-Leninist Philosophy, Political Economy, and Scientific Communism) were extremely orthodox, cautious and, overall, unreliable. Therefore, the KGB administration decided to employ various non-orthodox sources of information that provided them with necessary information.

The KGB operatives selected the most articulate representatives of the college student community who were ready to share their sociological analyses with the state police. They prepared special reports/surveys of Soviet college student groups, which the KGB sent on to the Communist Party leadership. The KGB department in Kyiv sponsored a special study involving Odesa college students, which was disseminated in 1968 among all KGB officers and the party leadership as a "model" survey of a college group in Soviet Ukraine.[13] Interestingly, the most controversial and shocking observation of this 1968 survey, emphasizing the apolitical and cynical character of the students and their gradual distancing from the communist ideology, were used by the KGB in their active measures to counter the "dangerous ideological influences" in Soviet youth culture through the entire decade of the 1970s.[14] Many trends in youth behavior noted by that KGB survey of college students in 1968 survived throughout the 1980s and spread to other more numerous and much younger categories of Soviet Ukrainian youth, a phenomenon that required much more sophisticated and diverse active measures to eradicate it.

The 1968 survey highlighted the increasing political indifference, apathy, and the cynical attitude toward life among Soviet college students.[15] The students openly demonstrated their scepticism about the party and Komsomol leadership and their own membership in these organizations, which they used mainly for self-promotion purposes to advance their careers in college and enhance their opportunities on the job market.[16] According to the survey, the students' "encounters with the party and Komsomol leadership at colleges gave the impression that the Communist Party and Komsomol organizations were led by completely ignorant people who hopelessly lagged behind the modern requirements of life." As the author of the survey noted, "the college Communist Party leadership's ignorance of fashionable music, of the views of the favorite heroes of the youth, of the youth's expectations from their senior colleagues, and a lack of cultural knowledge among the communist leaders – [all this] leads to their students' perceptions of them as dogmatists and reactionaries."[17]

At the same time, college students exhibited their own shocking ignorance of Marxist and Leninist philosophy, as well as of the modern trends in Western philosophy, culture, and political thought. They tried to compensate for this by listening to the broadcasts of Western radio stations and by reading the literature available at the time. They discussed what they learned with their classmates during their drinking parties either in the dorms or in bars. As a result of these experiences, students developed their own notions of the Communist Party as "the sole ruling corrupt political organization" that routinely "re-produce[d] the Soviet bourgeoisie."[18] They were ready to accept the Western propaganda's clichés about the "degeneration of the Communist Party" in the Soviet Union. According to the 1968 survey, the students no longer believed that there were "real communists" anywhere. The very word "communist" was

[13] HDA SBU, f. 16, op. 1, spr. 977, ark. 253–88.
[14] This survey was submitted to the KGB on 13 September 1968. See "Obzor: Odesskoe studenchestvo. 1968 god" ["The Odessa College Students (1968)"] in HDA SBU, f. 16, op. 1, spr. 977, ark. 255–88.
[15] HDA SBU, f. 16, op. 1, spr. 977, ark. 258–59.
[16] HDA SBU, f. 16, op. 1, spr. 977, ark. 275–76.
[17] HDA SBU, f. 16, op. 1, spr. 977, ark. 275.
[18] HDA SBU, f. 16, op. 1, spr. 977, ark. 273.

discredited among the Soviet youth.[19] The Komsomol lost its ideological control over college students together with "its prestige and attractiveness to young people." The main reason behind the Komsomol's ideological failure rested in its inability to discover new forms of working with youth, and its absolute dependence on the institutional, party, and trade union administrations.[20] Students were sceptical about the anti-capitalist propaganda pouring from Soviet television and radio. They tried to avoid watching and listening to any kind of ideological shows that criticised the Western way of life.[21]

The 1968 survey designed to enlighten KGB officers also revealed that college students in the cities of eastern and southern Ukraine, such as Odesa and Dnipropetrovsk, exhibited their complete Russification. They "called the Ukrainian language a 'kolkhoz tongue,' considering its public usage ridiculous and bewildering" and arguing that the "knowledge of Ukrainian language is unnecessary" because of its provincial nature: "[this is] a rural language, the language of ignorant and poorly educated people." They resented the idea that southern Ukrainian cities, like Odesa, were to be Ukrainized and expressed their negative attitude toward Kyiv, "a city and a national center, where [Ukrainian] nationalists resided." In addition, the author of the survey emphasized that "even the rural [Ukrainian-speaking] students in [the city] turned to Russian language because they wanted to appear more cultured and civilized."[22]

The survey's detailed and quite convincing description of the massive commercialization and Americanization of the youth culture in cities like Odesa appears to be the most astonishing revelation for researchers. For many students, the labels and the expression "made in the USA" became the benchmarks of how good quality products and, more broadly, successful economic and social developments could be measured. They strongly believed that the Soviet economic conditions did not leave any space for the entrepreneurial talents of Soviet people to develop and become effective drivers of the socialist enterprise. The youth contended that, like in the United States, economic competition was necessary to force out low quality products from the Soviet market. Students appreciated the freedom of opinion and expression, which they thought existed only in the West. In their minds, the main criterion of "human success was defined by the level of his/her personal material prosperity (well-being)."[23]

It is noteworthy that, on the eve of the September 1968 Plenum of the CPSU that focused on the problems of transition to the new system of planning, the city youth discussed the revival of private entrepreneurship in light industry and the service sphere. College students preferred the black market to lecture halls, demonstrating a high propensity for commercial activities. They routinely joked that "the Americans are wise people, and therefore they have no ruling Communist Party, [only a market]."[24]

The author of the 1968 survey further argued that beyond commercialization, the hero cult was additional evidence of the effective penetration of American values into the consciousness of Soviet youth:

> A contemporary young boy and a girl needed a real hero (as a role model), but our films showed them
> either unusual people in unusual situations, or personalities that were so dull and boring that they could

[19] HDA SBU, f. 16, op. 1, spr. 977, ark. 274.
[20] HDA SBU, f. 16, op. 1, spr. 977, ark. 275.
[21] HDA SBU, f. 16, op. 1, spr. 977, ark. 274.
[22] HDA SBU, f. 16, op. 1, spr. 977, ark. 277–78. For a detailed discussion about Ukrainian speakers' Russification who moved to the city of Dnipropetrovsk from the Ukrainian countryside, see Zhuk, *Rock and Roll*, 176–79.
[23] HDA SBU, f. 16, op. 1, spr. 977, ark. 263, 281.
[24] HDA SBU, f. 16, op. 1, spr. 977, ark. 280–81.

not be an example for emulation. In this light, the heroes of Western films, strong handsome characters who solved their problems with a punch, unknowingly became the models for emulation. After watching the film *The Magnificent Seven*, half of college male students developed the walking style of Chris (the major character of the film). The youth love strength; that was why the body-building fashion, which came from the West and was initially criticized by our ideologists, achieved an unprecedented popularity in the country. Regarding this cult of strength, it is noteworthy that we witness a surprising rise of sympathy with fascism among some students. Agreeing with its blunders (such as the annihilation of Jews), they admire the attractive appearance of tall and handsome Arians (*ariitsy*), parading in the military marches…[25]

KGB analysts also identified another characteristic of the collective portrait of college students from Odesa – antisemitism and racist attitudes, especially toward African college students. Paradoxically, they physically attacked students from Africa, calling them "black-ass people" (*chornozhopye*), simultaneously supporting Czech students during the Prague Spring, and openly expressing their affinity with American jazz and beat-music.[26]

Besides such cases of racism, the idealization of fascist leaders, and antisemitism, the KGB noted the rise of Ukrainian nationalism and Zionism among college students in other eastern Ukrainian cities. In some Russian-speaking cities of eastern Ukraine, such as Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk, the KGB officers recorded frequent cases of Ukrainian nationalism. They attributed the rise of nationalism in Dnipropetrovsk, for instance, to demographic and political developments, following the 1956 sensational Twentieth Party Congress. According to a KGB decision, former political prisoners who had been indicted for "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism" and had served their prison terms in the Gulag were released. However, they were not allowed to return to their homes in western Ukraine. These prisoners, identified as *banderovtsy* in official documents, were either members or supporters of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), and/or members of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church (Uniate or the Ukrainian Greek-rite Catholic Church) from the Trans-Carpathian and Galician regions of western Ukraine.[27] After 1945, when the Soviet Army suppressed these patriotic and anti-Soviet movements, thousands of adherents were exiled to Siberia and Kazakhstan. KGB officials tried to prevent any contacts between these former political prisoners and their homeland in western Ukraine. By the mid-sixties, many of these ex-prisoners settled in eastern, more Russified regions of Ukraine. The KGB tried to regiment the movements of Ukrainian nationalists and dilute them by more diverse, and less Ukrainian, people of the Dnipropetrovsk and Donetsk oblasts. By 1967, 1,041 former political prisoners who were labeled "Ukrainian nationalists" from western Ukraine had settled in the Dnipropetrovsk oblast alone.[28]

This posed a danger to ideological and political control of eastern Ukraine because ex-prisoners resided in strategically important cities and their vicinity, such as Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv. The amalgamation of several factors, including a cultural influx of college students from western Ukraine to the Dnipropetrovsk oblast and ex-prisoners' influences, provoked a serious international scandal, involving a group of local young patriotic Ukrainian-speaking

[25] HDA SBU, f. 16, op. 1, spr. 977, ark. 281–82. For more details about the cult of *The Magnificent Seven* among Soviet youth, see Sergei I. Zhuk, *Soviet Americana: The Cultural History of Russian and Ukrainian Americanists* (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2018 [London and New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2019]), 138–140.
[26] HDA SBU, f. 16, op. 1, spr. 977, ark. 281–83.
[27] *Banderovtsy* was derived from the name of Stepan Bandera, a leader of the OUN radical branch. His name became a symbol of the Ukrainian national cause in western Ukraine since the late 1940s. See Serhy Yekelchyk, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 125–28, 141–51.
[28] Derzhavnyi Arkhiv Dnipropetrovskoi Oblasti (hereafter: DADO), f. 19, op. 52, spr. 72, ark. 9.

poets. They complained about the official politics of Russification in eastern Ukraine. They sent copies of their "Letter from the Creative Youth of Dnipropetrovsk," in which they documented the KGB's suppression of Ukrainian patriots and massive Russification of Soviet Ukraine, to various offices of the Communist Party, the Komsomol, and Soviet organizations and colleges in Kyiv and Dnipropetrovsk in the period from August to December of 1968.[29] Ultimately, the letter reached Ukrainian émigré centers abroad. The following spring, foreign radio stations, such as Liberty, included the text of this letter in their broadcasts.[30] In 1969–1970, the KGB managed to supress this group of young Ukrainian patriots.[31]

Until 1990, criminal cases focused on Ukrainian nationalism had always been connected to the activities of college students in Soviet Ukraine. Their "Americanization" was a serious concern for KGB officers, a process that was shaped by new forms of daily consumption of Western (in many cases, American) cultural products, especially popular music. The KGB associated this process with the emergence of hippies in Soviet Ukraine, considering the imposition of American influences on Soviet youth a political threat to the Soviet system.[32]

In Ukraine, the KGB concentrated on the hippie movement as early as 1968. The first official KGB report about this movement was submitted to the party leadership in Kyiv on 20 May 1969, stating that the followers of this movement were discovered in Kyiv, Simferopol, Luhansk, Odesa, Lviv, Rivne and other Ukrainian cities. They were predominantly teenagers and young adults, students of high schools and college students. According to this document, those hippies emulated Western lifestyles to the last detail: "Some of them, using various excuses, try to avoid military service, criticize the Soviet order, lead immoral lives, use drugs, systematically establish contacts with foreigners, and are involved in black market transactions (*fartsovka*). [...] Gatherings of hippies are held in private apartments and, as a rule, are accompanied by parties with alcohol and listening to new releases of foreign jazz music that are frequently ended in orgies."[33] The transgressor established contacts with like-minded people in Ukraine and outside the republic. To better explain the hippie phenomenon to party leaders, KGB analysts interjected excerpts from an analytical article on American hippies, written by an American social psychologist from Yale University, Kenneth Keniston, and published in Russian translation in the American magazine *Amerika*.[34] The Soviet leadership immediately ordered the KGB to

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[29] See the original text of this letter in Ukrainian in Raisa Lysha, Yurii Vivtash, and Orysia Sokulska, eds., *Porohy: Vybrane*, vol. 1–9 (Kyiv: Smoloskyp, 2009), 432–38. In August of 1968, this letter was sent to the Head of the Council of Ministers of the UkrSSR V. V. Shcherbytskyi, the Candidate Member of the Politburo of the Central Party Committee F. D. Ovcharenko, and the Secretary of the Writers' Union D. V. Pavlychko.

[30] See the English translation of this letter in *The Ukrainian Review* XVI, no. 3 (1969): 46–52. This text entitled "Letter from the Creative Youth of Dnipropetrovsk" was published without the author's name. As a result of international publicity of this case, the first scholarly analysis of these events appeared in English in Kenneth C. Farmer, *Ukrainian Nationalism in the Post-Stalin Era: Myth, Symbols and Ideology in Soviet Nationalities Policy* (The Hague, Boston, London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1980), 158–59. Compare with Ludmilla Alexeyeva, *Soviet Dissent: Contemporary Movements for National, Religious, and Human Rights*, trans. Carol Pearce and John Glad (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1985), 40. See also HDA SBU, f. 16, op. 1, spr. 977, ark. 367–71.

[31] For more details, see Zhuk, *Rock and Roll*, 48–64.

[32] As early as 1996, KGB documents on Soviet hippies were quoted in a book by a prominent Soviet dissident. See Bukovsky, *Judgment in Moscow,* 136.

[33] HDA SBU, f. 16, op.1, spr. 974, ark. 114–15.

[34] Ibid. See also *Amerika*, no. 150, April 1969, pp. 12–18. *Amerika* was a monthly periodical published in Russian by the U.S. Information Agency, beginning from 1959. KGB analysts discussed a shorter version of Keniston's article published in *Amerika* in Russian translation. For a full version, see Kenneth Keniston, "Youth, Change and Violence," *The American Scholar* 37, no. 2 (1968): 227–45. The KGB was concerned about the Soviet hippies who,

design active measures regarding this new cultural phenomenon popular among the Soviet youth.

As a response, on 16 February 1971, KGB officials submitted another, more detailed, report to party leaders with a description of active measures to curtail this movement.[35] The KGB intended to conduct these operations in the cities where this movement originated – in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Lviv, Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, Donetsk, Voroshylovhrad, Zaporizhzhia, Simferopol, Rivne, Poltava, Kirovohrad, Sumy, and Chernivtsy. The members of hippie groups were divided into two social groups: 1) *fartsovshchiks* (black marketers) and 2) *bitlomans*, the fans of "beat-music" (Anglo-American rock-n-roll).[36] The KGB's main concern, however, laid in the sphere of ideology: "While the hippies in the West protest against bourgeois society's rules, their emulators in our country advocate the revision of moral and ethical norms of the socialist way of life, striving to create their own moral norms."[37] Despite the fact that the majority of the movement's members were college students (including college dropouts), the leaders were more mature individuals, who explained the emergence of hippies in the USSR by political motives. According to the KGB, they positioned themselves as the articulators of oppositionist ideas and formulators of a program of activities. To illustrate the political danger of these people, KGB operatives quoted "one of the authorities" among the Kharkiv hippies, A. L. Kleshcheiev who explained to the KGB officer:

> …We advocate democracy, the free choice of moral norms (*svoboda nravov*), free speech, freedom of creativity, freedom to propagandize our own ideas, freedom to demonstrate, free love, and behavior unlimited by moral constraint. A society should not interfere in the [development of] personality: if I do not impose on other people, I do what I want to do – I can sit or lie down where I want; if there is the possibility to live without working – I avoid working, because our needs are minimal; I want to be dressed in what I'd like or go naked; I want to spend the night where I'd like, and travel where I like. Because these [options] are unavailable to us, my friends and I believe that our [Soviet] authorities do wrong things […] we have no full freedom and democracy; and people who have power to change [this situation] are narrow-minded and do not understand our demands. We conclude that at this stage, under this political system [in the USSR], it is unlikely that we can achieve our goals […] the West seems to us more progressive and democratic than our [political] regime …[38]

In their reports to Ukraine's party boss Petro Shelest, KGB officials suggested that the hippies' behavior in public was unacceptable. Drinking, gambling, drug abuse, black market transactions (*fartsovka*), and sexual perversions became habitual for the hippies. Their gatherings at restaurants, cafes, and city parks began to attract public attention because of their obscene

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like their American counterparts, might use political violence and create alternative political structures that would disrupt the political status quo. According to Keniston's interpretation, that is what American hippies tried to accomplish. Those Soviet hippies planned to participate "in the all-Union congress during this summer (1969) either in Riga, or Tallinn." Even recent graduates of high schools demonstrated a similar behavior in 1969 and 1970. Some of them organized a secret society in the city of Slaviansk (Donetsk oblast), known as "Koka-Kola," "expressing their protest against the existing political order." See HDA SBU, f. 16, op. 1, spr. 1009, ark. 167–68. Among numerous studies on hippies as part of American counterculture, the best historical analysis was offered by Peter Braunstein and Michael William Doyle in their "Introduction: Historicizing the American Counterculture of the 1960s and '70s" to *Imagine Nation: The American Counterculture of the 1960s and '70s*, ed. Peter Braunstein and Michael William Doyle (New York: Routledge, 2002), 5–14.

[35] HDA SBU, f. 16, op.1, spr. 1011, ark. 81–92 (with a hand-written note by a party secretary "Report personally on the measures" on ark. 81). See a copy of the same report in HDA SBU, f. 16, op. 1, spr. 1009, ark. 317–28.

[36] On those groups, see Zhuk, *Rock and Roll*, 79–92, 97–105.

[37] HDA SBU, f. 16, op. 1, spr. 1011, ark. 81.

[38] HDA SBU, f. 16, op. 1, spr. 1011, ark. 82.

language, improper appearance, and offensive behavior. The KGB also informed Shelest that these individuals attempted to avoid the military draft and any type of socially useful work, lived the lives of vagabonds, and engaged in seditious conversations. According to KGB analysts, this behavior was shaped by the ideologically harmful influence of foreign radio broadcasting that the hippies systematically listened to.[39] The major KGB concern was to prevent the hippies from organizing and establishing an intercity communication network. There was information about such attempts when in 1969 the representatives of various hippie groups in Kyiv, Odesa, Kharkiv, and Voroshylovhrad tried to organize the first republican, and then all-Union, congresses that would help unite all hippies in one centralized organization. The objective of this organization would be sharing literature and art to popularize the ideas and the philosophy of hippies. The KGB operatives infiltrated the most active groups, undermining their efforts from inside.[40]

As a result of these "prophylactic measures" against hippies in 1970, KGB officers were able to offer their bosses a general picture of hippie groups and their origin. Twenty members of two hippie groups in Kharkiv served as the model for their investigations. The KGB learned that their initial impulse for gathering together came from their passion for western (rock) music. In 1968, two students, A. Soloviev and A. Makarenko, and one dropout, Yu. Shatunovskii, from the Kharkiv State University, created an "amateur club of fans" of rock music that in 1968 and 1969 organized numerous so-called "psycho-concerts" in their private apartments and in the basements and stairways of public places. According to KGB reports, the ideologically dangerous events included music by foreign music stars, including "songs of obscene content, questionable in a political and artistic sense." The KGB emphasized that these individuals planned to unite up to 2000 people, and they even wrote a program that stipulated the rights and duties of its members. The conspiratorial club "Society of Fighters for the Flaming Heart of Danko" ("Bortsy za ogon-tolchki v obshchestvo Danko) was named after Danko, a character from Maxim Gorky's *Old Izergil*, who sacrificed himself, saving his people with his flaming heart. The club members adopted a song performed by the the British rock band "The Animals" as its hymn.[41]

In October of 1969, Makarenko and Shatunovskii made an attempt to organize a demonstration of their followers at the Dzerzhynskyi Square in downtown Kharkiv. They planned to publicly demand the official recognition of their hippie organization by local authorities. The KGB conducted a special operation to curtail these activities, arresting ten Kharkiv hippie activists. Similarly, in April of 1970 in Voroshylovhrad, nine participants of a local hippie group were arrested for using drugs in public. The same month, the KGB reported that a hippie group from Zaporizhzhia organized a march in the city, attempting to popularize their ideas. Also Lviv had their own share of hippies: in December of 1970, 22 local hippies composed a statute (*ustav*) of the hippie club, planning a similar action. In April of 1971, 30 hippies from Ivano-Frankivsk organized a rock concert at the city's central square. The evening of 18 June 1971 in Chernivtsi became memorable for the arrest of 17 hippies by KGB operatives.

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[39] HDA SBU, f. 16, op. 1, spr. 1011, ark. 85.

[40] HDA SBU, f. 16, op. 1, spr. 1011, ark. 84. "In April 1970, more than 100 hippies from different cities of the USSR, including Lviv, met in Vilnius, where they had a non-official festival of acoustic music (without electric instruments)."

[41] HDA SBU, f. 16, op. 1, spr. 1011, ark. 85–86. The third part of Gorky's *Old Izergil* entitled "The Flaming Heart of Danko" was an obligatory reading in Russian literature classes in Soviet high schools. Writing the report, a KGB officer, by mistake, presented the British rock band "The Animals" as American. ("Amerikanskii modernistskii ansambl 'Zhivotnyie'" in the original, ark. 86).

To celebrate Paul McCartney's birthday, the hippies had marched in the streets, carrying hand-made banners with his portrait, completely paralyzing Chernivtsi's downtown. Numerous arrests by the KGB eventually ceased these public actions, but not the movement itself.[42] It kept growing, especially in the capital city of Kyiv.

By late 1969, the KGB discovered more than 170 hippies in Kyiv and uncovered their "president." S. Baiev, a dropout from the Kyiv Pedagogical Institute, tried to unite and consolidate the movement in Kyiv. Baiev's behavior was rather provocative. He maintained contacts with foreign tourists and journalists, especially with Americans, and publicly criticized the Soviet system. He and his followers condemned the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet troops, expressing their desire to escape abroad.[43] Despite KGB active and prophylactic measures (arrests, expulsions from the Komsomol and colleges, interrogations of the participants and their parents), the hippie groups in Kyiv survived. In 1974, another hippie leader and a student of the Department of Biology at the Kyiv State University, Oleh Pokalchuk, reenergized the movement, accentuating the religious (spiritual) dimension in the life of Ukrainian hippies. Pokalchuk conceptualized a "Buddhist commune" as a new hippie model for his followers. During 1974–1975, the KGB documented active interactions of Ukrainian hippies with Orthodox Christian and Baptist communities, and the growing Krishnaite movement in Soviet Ukraine. These links helped them eventually connect with their foreign co-religionists.[44]

On 11 October 1979, in his official report to Volodymyr Shcherbytskyi, Vitalii Fedorchuk, head of the Ukrainian KGB, acknowledged the KGB failure to stop the "*hippisty*" movement in Ukraine. According to his statistics, the KGB recorded 80 criminal cases launched against those "who imitated Western hippies" in various regions of Ukraine: Lviv 48, Donetsk 6, Crimea 5, Poltava 5, Zaporizhzhia 5, Dnipropetrovsk 4, Kyiv 2, Kherson 2, Ternopil 2, Chernihiv 1. Among them, 65 people were between 16 and 25 years of age, and 15 people between 26 and 30 years of age; 64 were males, and 16 were females.[45] Thirteen of them had been "targets of active KGB measures;" 10 were "involved in ideologically harmful actions;" 3 were indicted for criminal offences; 8 were arrested for manufacturing and selling drugs; 27 were arrested for using drugs; 15 were receiving medical treatment in mental institutions; 10 were "arrested for avoiding military service; and approximately 50% of all Ukrainian hippies did not study or work."[46] As late as April 1987, the KGB still confirmed the existence of the "hippies-pacifists" in Ukraine who called themselves "*Sistema*." Overall, there were 60 hippies in the republic (mainly in Dnipropetrovsk, Lviv, Odesa, and Simferopol), and 30 in Kyiv.[47]

KGB reports offered the Ukrainian communist leadership a relatively thorough sociological analysis of the hippie movement and KGB active measures that were employed from 1969 to 1987 to curtail the movement in Ukraine. Based on interviews with former hippies, one such report stated:

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[42] HDA SBU, f. 16, op. 1, spr. 1011, ark. 87–88; f. 16, op. 1, spr. 993, ark. 358–61; f. 16, op. 1, spr. 1015, ark. 325.
[43] HDA SBU, f. 16, op. 1, spr. 1011, ark. 88–89.
[44] On Pokalchuk, see HDA SBU, f. 16, op. 1, spr. 1095, ark. 182–85; for more on the hippies' engagement with the Orthodox Church in Kupiansk, see HDA SBU, f. 16, op. 1, spr. 1089, ark. 321; for a report about the substantial growth of Krishnaites in Ukraine, see HDA SBU, f. 16, op. 1, spr. 1175, ark. 132–34, and f. 16, op. 1, spr. 1184, ark. 36–37. See also DADO, f. 19, op. 60, spr. 85, ark. 7, 17, and Zhuk, *Rock and Roll*, 200, 201, 205. Some police officers reported that the hippies had publicly displayed various religious symbols, such as Christian crosses and icons, as well as portraits of Krishna and Buddha.
[45] HDA SBU, f. 16, op. 1, spr. 1162, ark. 126.
[46] HDA SBU, f. 16, op. 1, spr. 1162, ark. 128.
[47] HDA SBU, f. 16, op. 1, spr. 1249, ark. 147.

On the one hand, there are young people, who (due to their young age) aspire to something unusual and romantic, reading a certain type of literature […] and are keen on their crazy ideas and colorful clothes […] (which allow them to stand out among their peers). On the other hand, there is another group of young people who understand very well the incompatibility of the hippies' ideas with the Soviet system, nevertheless, joining the movement consciously. [These] people […] make money using this movement, i.e., selling clothes ("*fartsuiut barakhlom*"), drugs, and other things […][they] criticize ("*khaiut*") all Soviet things, calling them "*sovdela*" (Soviet stuff) […] [and] want to escape to the West, inciting others to do the same. […] many of them maintain connections with people living abroad, write and send letters abroad; they have relatives or friends there, or routinely establish contacts with foreigners visiting the city […] In their milieu, they propagandize "free love," freedom of behavior and actions, parasitism and reluctance to obey (Soviet) laws and moral norms, calling this coercion […] They insist that "we have no democracy if we have only one ruling political party," and that people should enjoy their lives instead of wasting it for the state…[48]

For the KGB, the major threat of the hippie movement seemed to be the politicization of Soviet youth and the emergence of political practices among them. The KGB identified this as the "institutionalization" of Soviet hippies, which was ultimately a dangerous alternative to Soviet youth institutions such as the Komsomol. KGB operatives feared the spread of this movement: the tentacles of the underground hippie clubs reached all major industrial cities. For instance, in February 1971 in Kirovohrad, local hippies organized the anti-Komsomol "Union of Free Youth" that included 20 members. They planned to organize a mass demonstration of the "free youth" of Kirovohrad, designed to mobilize young people for a collective fight for "freedom of speech, free love, and freedom of demonstrations."[49] The active measures of the local KGB office, including the infiltration of this hippie organization by KGB undercover officers, managed to prevent these activities.

The ideological justification for KGB covert operations against the youth culture were the hippies' alleged connections to fascism and neo-fascism portrayed as an intrinsic feature that underpinned the Prague Spring. In the KGB analysis, the hippies were active collaborators of pro-fascist elements in Czechoslovakia who allegedly inspired the 1968 Prague Spring. Similar claims related to socialist Hungary, where hippie groups were arrested for allegedly collecting intelligence for one of the Western diversion spy centers. In 1971, the KGB exploited the same ideological arguments when analyzing the activities of Ukraine's hippies who allegedly spread fascist ideas. The declarations made by Oleksandr Balykin, a student at the Mykolaiv Ship-Building Institute, about the similarities between the modern youth's worldview and Hitler's ideas discarding conscience, shame, and morality, served as supporting evidence for the KGB. Its analysis also included a Ukrainian hippie group from Lviv as an example of this connection, highlighting their "black ties," crosses, and swastikas that the hippies displayed on numerous occasions publicly.[50] The alleged links between the hippie and fascist ideologies gave the KGB carte blanche to act aggressively and curtail the political activism of youth in Soviet Ukraine.

Clearly, the Czech youth political activities in 1968 forced the KGB to think about the

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[48] HDA SBU, f. 16, op. 1, spr. 1011, ark. 90. KGB officers, who studied local hippies, distanced themselves from the "ideological nonsense" of Komsomol periodicals, which wrote that the "American hippies were a satanic sect embracing a mixture of palmistry, astrology, and black magic, and that the hippies were looking for a virgin girl for their devilish black mass ritual and could not find such girls among themselves." See the author's interview with Stepan Ivanovich T., a retired KGB officer, 30 January 2019, Kyiv, Ukraine. He referred to Mykola Solomatin, "Zhertvy chornoi magii," *Ranok,* no. 1, January 1974, pp. 18–19.
[49] HDA SBU, f. 16, op. 1, spr. 1015, ark. 324–25.
[50] HDA SBU, f. 16, op. 1, spr. 1015, ark. 323.

Ukrainian hippies' political activism in similar terms. The commercialization of Soviet youth culture and disco music that became extremely popular among Soviet youth seemed innocent in comparison with political statements made by the hippies and their attempts to organize. The KGB arrested hundreds of Ukrainian imitators of American hippies and expelled them from universities and the Komsomol all over Ukraine. Ukrainian punks who were similarly portrayed as neo-Nazi presented the same threat to the Soviet system, the Soviet Ukrainian culture, and the Soviet identity of Komsomol members.

The KGB Anti-Fascist Campaign

The KGB documented two massive organized youth movements in Soviet Ukraine after Stalin, which challenged the very existence of the Komsomol, an official Soviet youth organization, and offered the venues for anti-Soviet activities in which thousands of Komsomol members participated in the 1960s–1980s. The hippie movement emerged first, followed by the punk "imitation" movement. At the beginning, the members of both movements had some cultural fixation with Western cultural products, mainly rock music and films, but by the 1980s their cultural practices evolved embracing neo-Nazi ideas, processes that were documented by the KGB. These practices became more prominent, and even radical, especially among Soviet imitators of Western punks.[51] Moreover, in contrast to the Ukrainian followers of hippies who were older and more college educated, adopting American cultural practices of pacifism and non-violence, the Ukrainian punks were much younger, with only high school education, and they adopted more radical, violent, and sometimes explicitly neo-fascist models informed by the neo-fascist movements that emerged in Italy, Germany, and Britain after 1945.

In the fall of 1982, in their letters to Ukraine's communist leaders, KGB officers persisted in their claims that Soviet Ukrainian youth exhibited clear affinity with neo-Nazi and fascist ideas. The KGB discovered numerous pictures of fascist swastika on sidewalks and the walls of public buildings and telephone booths in many Ukraine cities, including the city of Chernivtsi. In September 1982, the KGB established the identity of at least five former students of the local technical schools (all of them were between 17 and 19 years of age) who were engaged in those "neo-fascist" activities. The report stated that they all listened to American "beat-music worshipping American pop-idols," which profoundly shaped their worldviews.[52]

In addition, the KGB report stressed that the Italian film *San Babila – 8 PM* (in Italian: *San Babila ore 20: un delitto inutile*), a "film about the outrages of fascist youth [in Italy] [*beschinstvakh fashistvuiushchei molodiozhi*]," contributed to those young people's interest in fascist ideology, symbols, and paraphernalia.[53] This film was directed by Carlo Lizzani in 1976, and was included in the program of the Tenth Moscow International Film Festival in 1977. The idea of the film was inspired by violent events that took place at the Piazza San Babila in Milan in 1975. Groups of neo-fascists and anarchist communists became the protagonists for this film. Four Milanese boys were part of a neo-fascist group that subscribed to Benito Mussolini's ideas of a new order, based on "*squadrism.*"[54] The boys were fighting against the youth groups

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[51] Zhuk, *Rock and Roll*, 102, 103, 170–71, 267–79.

[52] HDA SBU, f. 16, op. 1, spr. 1200, ark. 68; the author's interview with Stepan Ivanovich T., a retired KGB officer, 30 January 2019, Kyiv, Ukraine.

[53] HDA SBU, f. 16, op. 1, spr. 1200, ark. 68.

[54] *Squadrismo* is an Italian term for the Italian fascist movement, based on armed squads and led by Benito Mussolini. See Roberta Suzzi Valli, "The Myth of *Squadrismo* in the Fascist Regime," *Journal of Contemporary History* 35, no. 35 (2000): 131–50.

of communists and anarchists and frequently collided during the protests with violent outcomes. As the film portrays, one day the leader of the neo-fascist group asked Franco, the most insecure boy of the brigade, to perform a violent and demonstrative act against a randomly chosen communist boy, in order to redeem his "honor." So one night at the Piazza San Babila, the boys met a couple of lovers, dressed in red (they were believed to be communists). The group's state of madness drove the boys to chase the lovers and stab them. Franco was shocked and ran away from home, denouncing the assault to the police.

The KGB officer realized that the young Ukrainian imitators of Italian neo-fascism were especially influenced by the images of fashionable outfits and behavioral patterns of the young neo-fascist heroes from this Italian film.[55] At home the young men listened to forbidden rock music broadcast by foreign radio stations, organized their meetings at a Chernivtsi downtown café, and publicly denounced the Soviet system and politics.[56] Two of them, the leaders of that group, openly discussed the potential replacement of the Soviet political system that, in their view, was absolutely necessary, and a transfer of political power to a "military regime" that would manage the state through the fascist methods of political governing. The police discovered that these individuals displayed large images of a swastika in public. They were also suspected of another transgression: on 10 May 1981 someone burned the Soviet state banner, hanging on the façade of a public building in downtown Chernivtsi.[57]

Moreover, these individuals argued that the Soviet political system must be replaced by the strong authoritarian power of the fascist state because the Soviet state was nothing less than a "mafia state" and the rule of the Soviet Communist Party was a "mafia rule." The police also learned that these references were widespread, and young neo-fascists embraced this terminology in all major Ukrainian cities. The depositions of those who were arrested were consistent, emphasizing the significant influence of the Italian film on them.[58]

The KGB Campaign against the Punks

In Soviet Ukraine, the KGB campaign against young neo-fascists converged with the old ideological campaign against the corrupt influences of Western popular music. This campaign was conceived in the 1960s as a struggle against the "beat music" of the Beatles and Rolling Stones and their hippie imitators, being reconceptualised as a campaign against "fascist punks" and reaching its peak in 1980-1981. To some extent, this campaign was a reaction to information published in Soviet central periodicals, where British punks were presented as neo-fascists and "skinheads." In this light, the connection between Western music, the punk movement, and fascist symbols established by the KGB became more transparent. They all were to be prohibited from mass consumption in the Soviet Union.

According to Soviet music critics, the description of punks as fascists offered in Soviet periodicals confused and disoriented thousands of communist ideologists in provincial cities of Soviet Ukraine:

> The only thing anyone knew about punks was that they were "fascists" because that's how our British-based correspondents had described them for us. Several angry feature articles appeared in the summer and

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[55] The author's interview with Stepan K., a retired KGB/SBU officer, 2 February 2019, Kyiv, Ukraine.
[56] HDA SBU, f. 16, op. 1, spr. 1200, ark. 68.
[57] Ibid.
[58] The author's interview with Stepan K., retired SBU/KGB officer, 2 February 2019, Kyiv, Ukraine. For more details about these Italian films, see Zhuk, *Rock and Roll*, 145–48.

fall of 1977 with lurid descriptions of their unsavoury appearance and disgraceful manners, including one that quoted sympathetically a diatribe from the *Daily Telegraph*. To illustrate all this, a few photos of "monsters" with swastikas were printed… The image of punks as Nazis was established very effectively, and in our country, as you should understand, the swastika will never receive a positive reaction, even purely for shock value.[59]

Indeed, Soviet propagandists shaped the views of KGB officials and Komsomol activists who believed that punks and fascists were the same. All Komsomol functionaries and those who ran discotheques in Soviet Ukraine received a special notice warning against the punk ideology. The warning included Russian translations of phrases employed by British punks. This information was reprinted in many publications by Ukrainian journalists who covered this anti-punk campaign. In their texts, they quoted the punk slogans: "Live only for today! Do not think about tomorrow! Do not give a damn about all these spiritual crutches of religion, utopia, and politics! Forget about this. Enjoy your day. You are young, and do not be in a hurry to become a new young corpse" [sic!]. Unfailingly, they emphasized the anti-human essence of "fascist punk music" that allegedly embodied "bestial cynicism and meanness," undermining the Soviet youth's moral principles.[60]

The first public scandal that involved both "fascist music" and the display of fascist symbols took place in the city of Dnipropetrovsk in the fall of 1982. The city police arrested two college students, Ihor Keivan and Oleksandr Plastun who owned record collections of Western music and whose public behavior was described as "neo-Nazi." These students were dressed in T-shirts with the images of American and Australian rock bands "Kiss" and "AC/DC," which attracted the attention of policemen who interpreted these images as "fascist." After Keivan's and Plastun's arrest, their "fascist" record collections were confiscated, and the information about these students' anti-Soviet behavior was sent to their colleges.

In December of 1982, the entire city of Dnipropetrovsk and the Dnipropetrovsk oblast were shaken by police raids and searches, part of the anti-fascist and anti-punk campaign. The Dnipropetrovsk City Party Committee approached Nadezhda A. Sarana, an experienced Communist and a member of the anti-fascist resistance group during the Second World War, and asked her to write a letter about the dangers of the local fascist punks' fashion statements. On 22 December 1982, the communist functionaries staged an open public meeting with participation of all communist and Komsomol activists in Dnipropetrovsk's downtown. During this event, they publicly endorsed Sarana's letter against the punks and declared war against the punk movement in Soviet Ukraine. Under KGB pressure, local ideologists organized a show trial of Keivan, Plastun, and another young punk, Vadym Shmeliov, that was held in January of 1983. All three were expelled from the Komsomol and their colleges. KGB officers were outraged when they learned that Keivan and Plastun interpreted this punishment as a violation of their

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[59] Artemy Troitsky, *Back in the USSR: The True Story of Rock in Russia* (London: Omnibus Press, 1987), 42–43.
[60] Even during Gorbachev's *perestroika*, local journalists and KGB officials still employed these materials. They reprinted some of the British punks' declarations for Komsomol ideologists' needs and tasks. See L. Gamolsky, N. Efremenko, and V. Inshakov, *Na barrikadakh sovesti: Ocherki, razmyshleniia, interviu* (Dnipropetrovsk: Politizdat, 1988), 139. The author's interview with Igor T., a KGB officer, 15 May 1991, Dnipropetrovsk, Ukraine; the author's interview with Mikhail Suvorov, 1 June 1991, Dnipropetrovsk, Ukraine. For a discussion about similar practices in Hungary, see Anna Szemere, *Up from the Underground: The Culture of Rock Music in Postsocialist Hungary* (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001).

human rights. This case established the precedent and routine practices of Komsomol cells in the region to purge those members who were suspected of enthusiasm for the forbidden music.[61]

This anti-punk campaign especially affected the Ukrainian fans of heavy metal music.[62] In 1983, the Dnipropetrovsk police arrested ten students from a local vocational school on charges of "hooliganism." The police discovered images of the Nazi era and of the American Ku Klux Klan in their possession. As it turned out, Serhii Onushev, Oleksandr Rvachenko, and their friends made white robes and put the letters KKK on them, impersonating their membership in this American organization.[63] Serhii Onushev was identified as the leader of this group, who listened to the tapes that included the music of the bands that "belonged to the pro-fascist movement – Kiss, Nazareth, AC/DC, and Black Sabbath."[64] Local ideologists established a direct connection between this music and the fascist inclinations of Onushev's group. According to them, the musicians of Kiss represented a group of four hooligans, who chose SS and Nazi symbols as the emblems of their band, tearing apart live chickens and vomiting during their performances. They emphasized that, for Soviet students, they had become idols and "trendsetters" in popular culture, inspiring young Soviet people to commit inhuman fascist acts.[65]

The case of Dmitrii Frolin, a student of the Department of Philology at Dnipropetrovsk University, became another sensational case that attracted the attention of local journalists. As a result of the anti-punk and anti-fascist campaign, Frolin was arrested in 1983 and expelled from both the Komsomol and the university in 1985 for "propaganda of fascism." Local ideologists pointed out that Frolin's activities were the direct result of "intensive listening" to the music by "fascist bands," such as Kiss and AC/DC: "Over his bed, Frolin put a fascist cross and a poster with the faces of the members of the band Kiss, distorted in non-human grimaces with ugly make up (Frolin paid forty rubles for this Kiss poster on the 'black market'). In addition, he had a variety of audio tapes with the music of Kiss and AC/DC. Just press a button of his tape recorder and you will hear this music."[66] A journalist called the audience to consider the ideological implications of these activities:

> They, the musicians of AC/DC, call themselves the devil's children. Their song "Back in Black" became an anthem of the American Nazi Party. During a Komsomol meeting, Dmitrii justified his behavior by saying: "I do not consider myself collecting such things a crime. This is just mere collecting. It does not matter what the subject of this collection is. These items reflect a certain period in the history of these

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[61] The author's interview with Mikhail Suvorov, 1 June 1991, Dnipropetrovsk, Ukraine; see also the Communist Party veteran Nadezhda Sarana's open letter entitled "We Declare War against Everybody Who Interferes in Our Lives and Work!" [*Boi tem, kto meshaet nam stroit i zhit*!], denouncing the local punks, and A. Liamina and L. Gamolskii, "Grazhdaninom byt obiazan" about the 22 December 1982 public trial in Dnipropetrovsk in *Dnepr vechernii,* 23 December 1982, p. 3. Compare these texts with that of the activists' reaction in "Iz vystuplenii uchastnikov sobraniia," in *Dnepr vechernii,* 23 December 1982, p. 3. See also L. Vasilieva, "Takim ne mesto sredi nas!" *Dnepr vechernii,* 10 January 1983, p. 3.

[62] Heavy metal music, known as "metal," is a genre of rock music that emerged in the late 1960s and further developed in the early 1970s in the United Kingdom and the United States.

[63] Gamolsky, Efremenko, and Inshakov, *Na barrikadakh sovesti,* 133.

[64] Ibid.

[65] Ibid.,134. In 1984–1985, some university students suffered persecutions for having posters of the British band Black Sabbath. The author's interview with Oleksandr Beznosov, 19 July 2008, the Department of History, Dnipropetrovsk University, Dnipropetrovsk, Ukraine.

[66] Gamolsky, Efremenko, and Inshakov, 135–36.

people. I consider listening to my favorite music and collecting music records part of my private life. And I have a right to protect my privacy, according to Soviet and international laws.[67]

In December of 1983, a local youth periodical published the results of a sociological analysis of ideological maturity among Dnipropetrovsk youth, compiled by the Komsomol scholars. According to their findings, special Komsomol raids discovered images of the American band Kiss in many student dorms at Dnipropetrovsk colleges. One could easily observe the SS symbols and Nazi signs on these images. The analysis also included a concern pertaining to the visual appearance of young people, stating that the majority of the student population in Dnipropetrovsk were wearing T-shirts that had images of the U.S. military insignia and ones that glorify capitalist countries hostile to the Soviet Union. Apparently, they purchased these T-shirts on the black market, wearing them even during their classes.[68]

According to KGB officers, the "youth culture of fascist music" was shaped by the idealization of Hitler and Ukrainian nationalist leaders, such as Stepan Bandera, who were active during the Second World War. In 1983 and 1984, the police arrested the members of a "fascist Banderovite group," students at the Dnipropetrovsk Agricultural Institute. These students, Konstantin Shipunov and his five followers, listened to "fascist rock music," organized their own party, and popularized the ideas of Nazi leaders and Ukrainian nationalist politicians. They criticized the Russification of cultural life in Ukraine, advocated Ukraine's independence from the Soviet Union, and insisted on protecting the national rights of all Ukrainian patriots.[69]

The criminal cases of Ukrainian "fascist" heavy metal fans reveal interesting connections among various forms of cultural consumption in Soviet Ukraine in 1982–1984. The arrested members of Onushev's and Shipunov's groups confessed that they were inspired by the images of "clean, intelligent and civilized" Nazi officers portrayed in the Soviet TV series *Seventeen Moments of Spring* (1973). Based on the novel by Yulian Semenov, a famous Soviet writer of mystery and spy novels, this TV series narrated the story of Shtirlitz (Viacheslav Tikhonov), a Soviet agent posing as a high-ranking Nazi officer in Hitlerite Germany in the spring of 1945, during the final months of the Second World War. Like Carlo Lizzani's film about Milanese fascists, this film became a real blockbuster during the 1970s and early 1980s in the USSR, romanticized in the imaginations of many "fascist" heavy metal fans and local "punks" who tried to emulate the dress code and behavior of Shtirlitz and other Nazi characters from this Soviet film.[70]

As early as December of 1983, the secretary of the Dnipropetrovsk regional Komsomol committee O. Fedoseev reported to the Komsomol Central Committee in Kyiv that in February–March of 1983, local ideologists encountered the rise of the punk movement in the city of Dnipropetrovsk, but they successfully mobilized all activists and "Soviet patriots," organizing

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[67] The journalist continued: "Let's think again! There is no justification for collecting the Nazi regalia! Many people in the West understand this. Leon Rappoport, an American professor from the University of Kansas, was absolutely right, when he sincerely declared: 'Collecting Nazi relics is certainly one of the forms of fascist propaganda.'" See Gamolsky, Efremenko, and Inshakov, 135–36; the author's interview with Mikhail Suvorov, 1 June 1991, Dnipropetrovsk, Ukraine.

[68] Yu. Lystopad, "Ideolohichna borotba i molod (Notatky z oblasnoi naukovo-praktychnoi konferentsii)," *Prapor iunosti,* 17 December 1983, p. 2.

[69] Gamolsky, Efremenko, and Inshakov, 137.

[70] For more about this film and similar cases during *perestroika*, see Richard Stites, *Russian Popular Culture: Entertainment and Society Since 1900* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 152, 168, 170; interview with Ihor T., a retired KGB officer, 15 May 1991, Dnipropetrovsk, Ukraine; Ihor T. also mentioned the Italian film's influences on Ukraine's youth.

special counter-propaganda events all over the city and the Dnipropetrovsk oblast. As a result, they managed to curtail this "fascist movement." The Dnipropetrovsk oblast Komsomol organization developed political measures on "how to fight fascist punks," which became a model for the entire republic. The KGB administration approved those measures.[71]

However, between 1982 and 1985, the KGB and the police identified twenty new groups of neo-fascists/punks in Ukraine who had hundreds of followers. Arrested by the police and interrogated by the KGB, the members of these groups employed various fascist symbols and paraphernalia, painted their faces "in punk fashion," and shaved their temples.[72] Only a few of them, however, had anything to do with the Nazi ideology or fascism.

Conclusion

The KGB's anti-hippie, anti-fascist, and anti-punk campaigns in Soviet Ukraine were intended to weaken young Ukrainians' fascination with the products of Western (especially American) popular culture, such as films and pop music, and their idealization of Western neo-fascist images and culture. However, the results of these campaigns were contrary to what had been expected. The campaigns contributed to the immense popularity of forbidden Western cultural products among young consumers. Ironically, these campaigns amplified the interest in Western culture among the transgressors' ideological supervisors who were supposed to erase it from the imagination of the Soviet youth.

Yet, there was another surprising and dangerous outcome of the anti-punk campaign in Soviet Ukraine, accentuated by KGB officers and local propagandists. During 1982–1984, the KGB active measures targeting "fascist punks" and the authorities' hostile and coercive actions against disobedient youth encouraged young people to think about the state in political terms, and to openly criticize the Soviet political system, identifying it as a mafia state.[73] Since 1967 and the anti-hippie campaigns in Soviet Ukraine, the KGB feared the potential "politicization" of cultural consumption by local youth. The drastic difference between the peaceful and relatively a-political Soviet hippies' behavior and that of the Ukrainian "fascist punks" inspired by Italian films and Anglo-American rock music exacerbated the KGB's fear. The political behavior of young Komsomol members became a dangerous cultural phenomenon. Their political programs, adopting neo-fascist cultural practices, challenged the Soviet political system that had to be replaced by a "more efficient, honest and stable" authoritarian system. Worse, many Ukrainian punks demanded the "liberation of Ukraine from Russian exploitation."[74] The cultural trends among young Soviet Ukrainians analyzed in this study – the mixture of popular culture and political nationalism – survived the KGB persecution, foreshadowing the distinct signs of revival in post-Soviet contemporary Ukraine.

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[71] Tsentralnyi Derzhavnyi Arkhiv Hromadskykh Ob'ednan Ukrainy (TsDAHOU), f. 7, op. 20, spr. 3087, ark. 43 ("Otchet Dnepropetrovskogo OK LKSMU ot 23 dekabria 1983 g.").

[72] HDA SBU, f. 16, op. 1, spr. 1197, ark. 30–31, 68–69; spr. 1200, ark. 236–237; interview with Ihor T., a retired KGB officer, 15 May 1991, Dnipropetrovsk, Ukraine.

[73] On how Soviet young consumers used films about the Italian mafia by Damiano Damiani to criticize the USSR as a mafia state, see Sergei I. Zhuk, "'The Disco Mafia' and 'Komsomol Capitalism' in Soviet Ukraine during Late Socialism," in *Material Culture in Russia and the USSR: Things, Values, Identities*, ed. Graham H. Roberts (London and Oxford: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2017), 173–95.

[74] HDA SBU, f. 16, op. 1, spr. 1192, ark. 68–69; f. 16, op. 1, spr. 1199, ark. 49.

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