Timothy Snyder -- A Ukrainian Political Nation is Being Formed Thanks to the Maidan and War

Timothy Snyder is an American historian and professor of Yale University. He came to Ukraine [in January 2016] to present a new translation of his work Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin, which was first published in the United States in 2010 and was translated into Ukrainian in 2011. Now, four years later, it also has a Russian translation, which is available not only as a book but also as a text through free Internet access. Timothy Snyder in our studio at Hromadske Radio talks about the new translation, the new concept of “bloodland,” the genocides in Ukraine, as well as the new life of old ideologies such as Stalin as an “effective manager” or “fascists” in Donbas. The program Encounters was created with the support of the Canadian charitable organization Ukrainian Jewish Encounter.

Iryna Slavinska: The renowned historian Timothy Snyder joins us in our studio. He came to Kyiv to present the new Russian-language translation of his book Bloodlands, and I have my first question for him. The book has been translated into Russian and this translation was not published in Russia. What does the appearance of this text in Russian mean for you? Who are your future readers and why?

Timothy Snyder: I finished this book five years ago and I did not know that in five years there would be a Russian edition of this book here, in Ukraine. I thought the book would be available for the Russians as well as for the Ukrainians. This is a somewhat strange situation in that the Russian translation was done but it was impossible for some reason to publish it in Russia. For me it is important that this book exists in the Russian language because it is based on Russian sources and I would not be able to write it without Russian colleagues. It is also very important for me that readers from Russia, as well as those from Ukraine and everybody who can read the Russian language, can now take part in the general discussion of this history.

I.S.: There is a very important gesture made by this translation—it is available online absolutely for free. Therefore, it can be read in any part of the world without buying the book. Is this important for sharing the ideas that you have in your text? How fundamental for you is this freedom of sharing the information? In any event, it differs a lot from a book that you can hold in your hands…

T.S.: Yes, I have to say that as a historian and author I am a very conventional person. For me it is normal when a Russian or Ukrainian person buys a book, but this situation is special, not ordinary, and that is why there was a decision to publish the book in this manner. I think it is a very nice idea in this situation. Now the book is available and without such a policy it would not be available at all.

I.S.: Let us continue our talk addressing those listeners who did not read Bloodlands yet, and who will read it for the first time. Please tell us about the concept of Bloodlands. What is this metaphor about?

T.S.: The main thought of this book is the following: the biggest catastrophe in history took place in the Europe between Berlin and Moscow from 1933 until 1945. From the Famine [Holodomor] to the Holocaust fourteen million peaceful people were deliberately killed in this region during this period. For me, this is a general catastrophe. There are different elements: Jewish, Ukrainian, Polish, Russian, etc.

The aim is to present the story so that a Russian, Ukrainian, or Polish person could see how their national history is linked with the national histories of other nations. If a Ukrainian or Polish person does not have access to other points of view, their own national histories do not matter. Thus, this is a “metallurgical experiment” to reveal history in such a manner that people from Poland, Ukraine, and Russia have this access. I tried to create a profile of the history that would be accessible for Europe. Thanks to this book, people in the West understand a little better the history of Ukraine and indeed the entire East.

I.S.: Is this history for western readers the revelation of something they did not know earlier?

T.S.: Yes. We are not better than you as we also have our national visions of history. For Americans or the French for instance, the history of the Second World War is a national history and the history of the Famine or the Stalin terror is the discovery of something new. I was trying to open up perspectives for the West so that we in the West would be able to understand that the real tragedies of the Second World War happened not only in France, and even not in Germany, but also in Russia, Ukraine, Poland, and Belarus.

I.S.: Lately in Ukraine there is more talk about the connection between different genocides. This is most obvious in Ukrainian material because we have the experience of the Holocaust, the Famine, and the deportation of the Crimean Tatars that we are starting to look at as somehow connected, and not as separate histories. In your eyes, are these different stories or a common history for people who lived on the territory of modern Ukraine, and, of course, in the Ukraine, Poland, and Belarus as it was before?

T.S.: I think they are different histories but histories that cannot be understood without other histories. If you for instance want to understand the deportation of Crimean Tatars, you need to know about the Poles who were deported from Ukraine before the war. If you want to understand the Famine, you need to understand that there was collectivization happening in the Soviet Union. If you for example want to understand the demolition of the entire city of Warsaw, you need to understand how the Nazis destroyed the cities in Belarus. These histories can be understood individually, like separate histories, but I think they are impossible to understand without other contexts. A national history is important but it raises questions that do not have any answers.

I.S.: Of course these bloody pages contain the experience that I think all Ukrainian families went through—the experience of the Famine. How well do you think this tragic history is told—by the Ukrainians about themselves, and by historians from other countries?

T.S.: I think the situation in the so-called West is becoming better. The Famine is now known, which was not the case ten years ago. There are no longer debates over whether the Famine really happened. There is a question about whether Famine was genocide, but this is a different question. I think people in Ukraine of course know that there really was a Famine. It would be interesting if Ukrainians described this history in a way that Europeans and others would understand the Famine not only in the national frameworks, but also as part of the history of the Soviet Union. For without this context foreigners do not have the possibility to understand this.

I.S.: In your opinion as a historian, can the Famine be called genocide?

 T.S.: I do not use this word at all in the book. If I say that something is or is not genocide, it would be the end of the discussion. Yes or no—this is a legal question, and not historical. I am responding to your question, but different other tragedies that were not genocides but were important tragedies are very important as well. I think that yes, it was genocide but for me this is the end of the discussion. For me this is not an important part of the discussion. For me, the collectivization and the Famine should be understood through the experience of people, and history should be written like that.

I.S.: If we talk about the history of the Holocaust in Ukraine, was it specifically distinct in comparison with other countries?

T.S.: The Holocaust in Ukraine was very similar to the Holocaust in, for example, Lithuania, Russia, or Belarus. It was the Holocaust because of the shootings; it was the Holocaust in which there was a lot of collaboration by Ukrainians, Russians, Poles, Lithuanians, everybody. Collaboration in the Holocaust is a very important historical question for the Ukrainians. However, to understand the responsibility of Ukrainians for this collaboration, we have to understand the issue of collaboration in Europe in general. This is a question not only for Ukrainians, but also for Poles, Russians…

There is no nation that has a monopoly on good or evil.

I.S.: The subject of the similarities between Hitler and Stalin in the former Soviet countries appeared not long ago. The idea that Stalin’s policy was as suicidal as the policy of Hitler is new, but it destroys the myth of the Great Victory and Stalin as the Big Winner. How fruitful is this debate on the influence on post-Soviet memory, what we remember, and what we do not remember about the Second World War? What is new in this comparison that we can read for ourselves? 

T.S.: The question of memory is not that important for the good historian. The historian has to write history in a way that broadens the horizons of the reader and maybe even the nation. He cannot respond so directly to myths or memory. I think history has its own freedom. If there were good history books and a free historical discussion it would be hard to create myths that monopolize good or evil. That is why I am not interested in whether Hitler or Stalin is worse. I think the topic of the book is how the Stalin and Hitler regimes existed together in Ukraine and in this region. This is not a question of “good vs. evil” but a question of experience. In this book I wanted to describe the experience, for example, of Ukrainians who had an encounter with Germany as well as with the Soviet Union. These experiences with both regimes are natural and also have the element of collaboration. Many people suffered from these regimes, but many also collaborated with both regimes. It is impossible to understand this experience through myths, memory, or ideology. There is a need for cold-blooded history that understands the possibilities of collaboration with both regimes, and a human history that allows us to understand the meaning of every life.

I.S.: Let us touch upon the history that impacts contemporary life. What does the dissemination in today’s Russian Federation of the image of Stalin as an effective manager mean? What are the lessons of history or traumas that appear here? 

T.S.: The Soviet Union was not a business. Stalin could not be a good manager. The analogy is completely baseless. I think the concept of manager was created so that people would not talk about the moral aspects of the history of the Soviet Union. To build the Soviet Union was a big task for Stalin, but he did not see himself as a manager. He understood that the revolution happened, and it needs to be protected. We have to understand Stalin not via the prism of Russian politics, but in the context where he was trying to build an entire alternative system in which, by the way, millions of people died. We cannot talk about management without mentioning politics because the institutions of death are the main element of the Stalinist system.

I.S.: There is some revival in the broad use of the word “fascist,” but it is used in relation to Ukrainians, in particular when talking about Ukrainian soldiers in the ATO [anti-terrorist operations, editor’s note] in specific regions of Donetsk and Luhansk. Of what common history does it speak? What traumas and images appear through this comparison?

T.S.: As you know, this “Manichean” vision of history of “fascists vs. anti-fascists” was born during the Second World War. Now this mechanism permits the division of people into “good” and “evil.” This is very easy. I think such a use of the word “fascist” is a tragedy. There are fascists in our world. There are fascists by the way in Russia, but there are also fascists in Europe and throughout the entire world. If we use the word “fascist” beyond its meaning, it will lose its true meaning. It will be difficult to fight fascism when this word will have no meaning. The irony is in the fact that Russia is now on the side of European fascists by giving them money and helping them fight against the European Union. Thus, the word “fascism” in this situation loses its true meaning and I think this is a tragedy.

I.S.: What are the ghosts of history? What unexplored lessons of history are haunting Ukraine now after the Euromaidan, a Ukraine which has a war called ATO, a Ukraine which has occupied territories?

T.S.: For me, the most important thing is that two years after the Maidan the creation of the Ukrainian political nation is happening. This is normal and this is natural. Even though I am a historian, I have to say that a nation is being created not because of the history, but because of experience and joint action. Because thanks to the Maidan, and unfortunately thanks to the war in the East, there is now a Ukrainian political nation that is a bit different from the one three years ago. At the same time in Russia, the Russian public does not understand the current war in Ukraine the way it really is. They still understand this war via the prism of the Second World War, and they do not understand Ukrainians as a political nation. This is more interesting for me than all the discussions about the Second World War.

I.S.: Can we view some special experiences of Donbas via the prism of the war?

T.S.: Yes, of course. Myths always have some value. Myths may not match the historical reality, but have their value. The myth that Donbas was always on the side of the Soviet Union is not true. In Donetsk there was the same collaboration as in Kyiv, Minsk, and wherever there was a German government in Russia, Ukraine, or Belarus. For example, two thousand people in Donetsk helped to kill Donetsk Jews. This is part of the history. “We were always on the good side” is a myth. But this is one problem. The other problem is that in Donbas the Soviet vision of history is stronger than in Kyiv or Lviv because there are people who came to live there mostly after the war. That is why we need time so that the other vision of history is more understandable for them.

We thank the Duliby publishing house for arranging this interview. Timothy Snyder’s book in Russian translation can be read freely online here. Bloodlands was translated and published into Ukrainian in 2011 by the publishing house Hrani-T. Look for it in the bookstores. The program Encounters was created with the support of the Canadian philanthropic fund Ukrainian Jewish Encounter. Listen. Think.

Originally appeared here.
Translated by: Olesya Kravchuk, journalist, interpreter
Additional translation and editing by Peter Bejger