Semion Goldin: "What seemed impossible after 1945 is now the new normal again"

Our conversation with the Israeli historian Semion Goldin is focused on how the Russo-Ukrainian War has affected Jewish Studies and Holocaust Studies, on the whole, in Ukraine and Russia. We also discussed the connection between the war in Gaza and the Russo-Ukrainian War. These two wars are part of a global geopolitical game and are radicalizing and polarizing Western societies. How should historians conduct themselves in these circumstances? Do they have the right to discuss controversial topics? These questions are addressed in the following interview.

"The scholarly sphere in Russia alone continues to function mostly in isolation from Western academic communities"

How kind of impact did the full-scale Russo-Ukrainian War have on Jewish Studies and Holocaust Studies in Ukraine and Russia? Was this impact felt in Israel?

The war completely transformed the situation, primarily because researchers found themselves in significantly changed circumstances. A large number of people left Ukraine and Russia, ending up in various places in entirely new circumstances. As for those who remained in Ukraine, the situation changed as well, particularly regarding academic opportunities.

Two things happened in Russia. A considerable number of scholars who work on Jewish Studies left immediately or within two years. Some of them did not plan to emigrate initially. Currently, my colleagues are based in various Western countries. Those who stayed behind have ended up as though behind an "iron curtain." This is an important negative change because the Russian scholarly community was part of the international one before 24 February 2022. For thirty years, an entire generation had worked to become part of the global academic community, and immense resources and efforts were dedicated to this goal. This also pertains to other directions in the evolution of modernizing processes in Russia over the last three decades. It is painful to see how everything was lost in a single moment, like a train derailing. So, the academic sphere in Russia continues to function mostly in isolation from Western academic communities. From what my Russian colleagues tell me, the only sphere where some collaboration between Russian organizations and Western institutions is possible is Holocaust Studies. I must emphasize that I obtained this information but did not verify it because I have not had any official contact with my Russian colleagues for over two years.

All other directions of Russian researchers' academic interactions with the West are fully blocked: grants, trips, opportunities for conducting joint projects, etc. I know that on the individual level, people are leaving, attending certain events. However, the development and forms of collaboration that existed earlier are no longer there.

In Ukraine, the situation also markedly changed. Large numbers of people have left, and those who stayed are working completely differently. But I see a countertrend: So far, there is lively and enthusiastic interest in Ukraine and Ukrainian researchers, which is also expanding to Jewish Studies. When the war began, all centers, universities, and foundations began searching for Ukrainians who could be provided assistance. They started publishing announcements and creating grant programs for scholars to apply and come in person or work remotely on these projects. Everyone who wanted an opportunity to benefit from this assistance did so.

We see how immense numbers of people became refugees and how their colleagues and various institutions helped them. I met many such colleagues during the international congress "Rethinking Ukraine and Europe: New Challenges for Historians" in Vilnius on 15–17 September 2023. Quite a few Ukrainian participants now live in various Western countries. When you speak with them, you realize that this person from Kharkiv is now in Switzerland, while someone from Dnipro is in the Netherlands. My general impression (naturally, I did not conduct any scholarly research on this subject) is that the number of opportunities and offers from Western academic institutions outweighed the number of Jewish Studies specialists who have made a successful career in Ukraine in this field in the last 30 years. This is because grant opportunities were predicated on a certain necessary qualification: at the very least, a working knowledge of English and the ability to communicate in this language. It turned out that there were very few such specialists. In these new realities, some colleagues became extraordinarily successful, managing to obtain three simultaneous grants — all due to the surge of interest in Ukraine and everything Ukrainian. Thus, international Jewish Studies were not left out, and scholars availed themselves of many fine opportunities. It is difficult to say how long this interest will last, but one thing is certain: Such intense interest cannot be sustained.

Israel is on the sidelines in these processes; we are not a full-fledged part of this general context. First, Israel has not severed contact with Russia on the state and academic levels; they still exist, unlike in other Western states. There are direct flights to this day. In the academic milieu, there have also been no formal or informal initiatives to sever ties. Israel is unique in this sense, as Russian scholars with a Russian affiliation can still come here and participate in academic events. It is difficult for me to conclude whether this is good or bad; I am merely stating the fact.

At the same time, our links with Ukraine are deepening. Inasmuch as the Israeli academic milieu is part of the Western one, it, too, sympathizes with Ukraine's situation. It has become popular and politically correct to invite Ukrainian researchers and conduct projects connected with Ukraine. In other words, some processes have affected us, but in other directions, we remain marginal in the context of Ukrainocentric trends in the West. At the same time, America does not have a complete ban on academic contacts with Russia, either. They exist. A substantial number of Russian scholars seeking positions in the West in the last two years have finally moved to the U.S. As usual, Israel orients itself somewhat on the U.S.

"Israeli society is very pro-Ukrainian"

Is there a threat of growing antisemitism stemming from the Russo-Ukrainian War?

I think we will understand this later. It's difficult to judge now, amid developments, but one can see that some interesting rethinking processes are taking place right now, above all in relation to Ukraine. These processes began long before the war. For a long time, Ukraine was considered to be a place marked not so much by a concentration of antisemitism but by problems that had accumulated in the sphere of historical memory connected to the legacy of the Holocaust, the Second World War, etc. In the Ukrainian realities of 20 years ago, it was problematic, at the very least, to do research on a substantial number of aspects of Ukrainian-Jewish relations. In the last 15–20 years, the situation has changed radically. It is fascinating for researchers to grasp what has taken place. This is connected to internal processes in Ukraine, where nation-building and the construction of a national narrative went unexpectedly down a more inclusive path. A certain convergence of the Ukrainian historical narrative with the Jewish one occurred. If you think about it, this is not a new phenomenon. It likely appeared a hundred years ago — recall Vladimir Jabotinsky and his close links with the Ukrainian movement in the early twentieth century. The Ukrainian national-democratic revolution of 1917–1922 was a period characterized by an array of contradictory processes: antisemitism, pogroms, violence, mutual distrust, and alienation, along with attempts to build bridges to Ukrainian-Jewish understanding.

The current changes took place thanks to the breakthrough in politics on the highest state level. At a certain point, the anniversaries of Babyn Yar began to be marked ostentatiously on the official level, and controversial topics in the history of the Second World War, particularly manifestations of anti-Jewish violence in the ranks of the OUN and the UPA, gradually began to be discussed in public and academic discourses. These topics were no longer a zone of silence; they crossed into a zone of articulation. On a personal level, the fact that many political leaders in Ukraine have Jewish roots played a significant role. Ukrainians grasped that, with a surname like Groysman, you can be prime minister of Ukraine, a patriot, and a statesman. This no longer seemed odd; ethnic origin ceased to be considered a key factor in determining a person's national identity. This was an extraordinarily powerful message to the outside world. Then, when Volodymyr Zelensky was elected president and Groysman was still prime minister (the composition of the government did not change immediately after the presidential election), everyone was joking that, besides Israel, Ukraine was the only country in the world where the president and the prime minister had Jewish roots. I cannot imagine that in Poland — or even in Russia, which boasts that it has eradicated antisemitism — such a situation would not trigger a huge public uproar. This did not happen in Ukraine. The country lived according to a different scenario, which is remarkably interesting.

I believe an excellent research topic would be to trace how the trajectory around the Jewish question changed during the creation of the Ukrainian national narrative between the 1990s and the 2020s. I suppose that the attitude toward the State of Israel may have played an important role in this regard because the minute that the Ukrainians tried on this Israeli "cap," when it was time to mount resistance and be in constant military danger from much stronger and more numerous enemies, it became clear that they had to seek allies and needed at least some small advantage. In this context, the Israeli experience turned out to be in great demand in the Ukrainian public discourse. Of course, these processes require more in-depth research. I do not know whether anyone has explored this question, but the popularity of the Israeli state-building experience in Ukraine undoubtedly merits attention.

How is the war affecting the level of antisemitism? We are not seeing this yet, so we cannot know. The attitude toward Israel, the Jewish people, and the Jewish question may be negatively affected by the fact that on the state level, Israel has not adopted a definite pro-Ukrainian position on the war. At the same time, the Israeli public is very pro-Ukrainian. I may be expressing a biased view because I myself am part of this public. However, in the last two years, I have not seen or communicated with anyone who is not pro-Ukrainian and who supports Russia's narratives.

It is more difficult for me to formulate an idea about Russia because I am permanently cut off from my Russian colleagues, so I have not monitored what is happening. But no matter how the war ends, Russia will be transformed as well; it is already being markedly transformed, particularly concerning the issue of antisemitism and the attitude to all things Jewish. Now, we are hearing statements that culprits will be sought, and Jews always fit this role. There may very well be an upsurge of antisemitism in the future. But this is only one of several possibilities, and I am not making any prognostications because this is not my profession.

It may be that the Israeli government's position, based on the presence of this threat of growing antisemitism in Russia, is undefined. In other words, is the unwillingness to sever relations with Russia due to the desire not to harm the Jewish community in that country?  

The government of Israel is acting pragmatically from the standpoint of the people who make decisions and take responsibility for them. They believe that, since the entire Western world is supporting Ukraine, we will not be helping especially. Our official decision to embark on a definite confrontation with Russia would not have a significant impact on the global situation. Instead, it would lead to symbolic and emotional consequences. At the same time, the practical losses from severing relations with Russia would be substantial, considering that it is Israel's permanent neighbor in the Middle East and wields considerable influence on the situation. The official position of the Israeli government considers the state's pragmatic interests. But there is also a different logic at work here. Russia has concluded a military alliance with Iran, and this alliance is against Ukraine. But such an alliance can also be directed against Israel, and the ally of my enemy cannot be my friend. In other words, we cannot seriously anticipate friendly relations or some kind of fruitful cooperation with Russia. But there are so many problems and enemies in Israel today that I would not advise that yet another front be opened.

"The last thing I would like to see in our country is a sole correct teaching, as was the case during Soviet times, when everything was interpreted through the prism of Marxism and the class struggle"

Both the propaganda discourse in Russia and the media discourse in Ukraine — even researchers — tend to draw parallels and compare the events of the Russo-Ukrainian War with the crimes of Nazism, particularly the Holocaust. To what extent are such comparisons productive?

The discourse that equates Ukrainian nationalism with the pro-Nazi, Nazi, or proto-Nazi one — whatever it is called — does indeed exist, and I cannot say whether it is without influence. Rather than being specifically connected to the war, it is part of the public discourse that existed long before 2022 and before Putin began accusing his Ukrainian enemies of "Nazism." It is impossible to say that it is not influencing the minds of people in Israel. I will give you an example. Imagine that it is the 1990s–early 2000s, and we are working, say, in Yad Vashem, researching the topic of collaboration with Nazi Germany. When we discover some facts connected with Ukraine, it turns out that they are inconvenient to discuss in Ukraine. No one talks about them, or they deny them altogether. Then, people find themselves in a position to oppose the official or mainstream Ukrainian narrative. As I noted earlier, the situation has changed significantly. Whether attitudes have changed is another question. In other words, these narratives are very tenacious and would still exist even without the war. Of course, the war has had a very profound effect on this.

To answer your question directly, I do not consider such comparisons productive. But I understand they are bound to happen because they have become a bargaining chip in the discourse. For professionals, of course, they sound strange at best and unacceptable at worst. But if we are talking about mass consciousness, this is the aspect of the discourse that both sides — Ukrainian and Russian — use. It may be impossible to avoid these comparisons and these common cognitive moves. The question is: What does this give us? It is another thing to try and formulate a broad contextual, historical comparison. (I tried to do this in some of my presentations.) For many years, I was professionally engaged in researching the First World War, the Russian army, and the civilian population's treatment of Jews during this period. If you look at what was happening then and now, during the war in Ukraine, it is impossible to rid yourself of the thought that there is something to compare here. Certain stable behavioral patterns that, from a historical perspective, look remarkably similar are evident.

The question remains: What to do with this? To what conclusions does this comparison lead us? Of course, the current army of the Russian Federation fighting in Ukraine and the Russian imperial army are very dissimilar. At the same time, some things appear similar. The war suggests that we need to reexamine established historical concepts that seem absolutely clear as regards the entire imperial period of Russian history, at least since the eighteenth century or even earlier. In my view, such comparisons are much more interesting and productive than seeing Ukraine and Russia accusing each other of the crimes of Nazism. I will give you an example. When I was in Vilnius, I walked in the city, chatting with a [female] colleague, a specialist in the history of the Early Modern period. We were discussing how the Russians behaved in Ukraine, and she said, "Look at all these ancient roofs in Vilnius. After the Russian army defeated the city in 1655, all the old roofs were shipped to Moscow. There were no tiles in Moscow, and they were amazed that they were [in Vilnius], so they removed the shingles and shipped them out. That is why all our roofs date from after 1655." Of course, this is a personal anecdote, but it illustrates what a wider perspective can offer to a comparative analysis.

Today, there is a lot of discussion about the need to decolonize narratives about the history of Eastern Europe both in Western academic discourse and in Eastern European countries. Is there such a need in Jewish Studies and Holocaust Studies?

This is an excellent and complex question. On the one hand, novel approaches and conceptual transformations are indispensable; we must view history in its long context in a unique way. But this does not work according to the on/off switch principle. For example, in our country, there was a narrative that I will call tentatively imperial or colonial, in which Jews were significantly more included in imperial history and much less in local history. In the Ukrainian case, it was elucidated through the prism of Jewish-Ukrainian relations. In this sense, an innovative approach is required; it may be called postcolonial or decolonial. However, the last thing I would like is for us to have a sole correct teaching, as was the case during Soviet times, when everything was interpreted through the prism of Marxism and the class struggle. In our case, this might become the prism of "colonialism — de-colonialism." In other words, it suffices to say that I use two or three appropriate terms and provide two or three correct citations from a founding classic. What will be written after that will not be important.

Original approaches and framework instruments are required; they will help us see complex situations of the past once we abandon the usual schemas. Of course, one might be postcolonialism or decolonization. However, there should be many different instruments and interesting, novel approaches — regionalism, for example, a regional perspective that can signify decolonization but not necessarily because it runs counter to the teleological national narrative in a certain sense as its alternative. In Ukraine, Galicia and everything connected with it is an example of this successful, vital, and fascinating regional narrative — and not just this region. There are many others, and not just in Ukraine. This is an alternative to the imperial and the national approach, which is understood as the sole correct and only possible mainstream narrative. In my view, the paradigm of violence is a very correct approach (my colleagues, including Yaroslav Hrytsak, talk about this). This paradigm is about how an instrument becomes a goal and affects what happens. Great, classic works by Andrea Graziosi, Timothy Snyder, and others exemplify this approach. There are other approaches. In other words, it is not enough to label it like, "In the past, there was an empire here; now there is decolonization." The way I see it, this is an egregious oversimplification that will quickly lead to a dead-end, to some kind of pseudo-Marxist paradigm of a sole correct teaching. Novel approaches are needed, but this innovation cannot be something exclusively correct. Rather, it will have to alter everything which is old and functioning badly.

"Before 7 October 2023, there was peace, and no one was attacking anyone until they were the first to attack us"

Hamas's attack on Israel on 7 October 2023 and the continuing escalation of the confrontation have captured the attention of people in many countries. These events have also triggered a wave of anti-Israeli protests and antisemitism. How is this situation affecting Jewish Studies and Holocaust Studies? And how can it affect them in the future? 

This is a very difficult time for us, too, in Israel and everything connected with Jews, especially in the academic milieu and the study of Jews and Jewish subjects worldwide. There are countries, cities, and universities where the situation is truly very acute. This cannot spark anything but surprised indignation. For example, my colleagues from a research institute in Paris tell me they have been working from home for a month already and will be working like that for a long time. This is happening because of public demonstrations. The administration is afraid that demonstrators will occupy their building. So, they ordered their associates to stay at home. I asked why and learned that demonstrators stood near the entrance, ordering all the employees and visitors to show their identification documents. Individuals with Jewish surnames or Israeli citizenship were not allowed into their workplace. This is happening in Paris in the twenty-first century.

At the same time, there is freedom of speech and self-expression. People have the right to express their opinion if it does not pose a risk to anyone. People believe that a genocide is happening in Palestine and join demonstrations to protest this. This is their right. However, this should not be aggressive or violate civil order and human rights. In practice, however, this is not the case everywhere. Everything depends on the administration's position and the degree to which it is prepared to be tough. Demonstrations are also taking place at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, where I work. Arab students are calling for an end to the war in Gaza. This is not a mainstream position in Israel, but they are offered the opportunity to hold such meetings, next to which are guards monitoring public order. Everything is taking place within the bounds of the law. In this sense, I am proud of Israel. As a democratic country, we can permit ourselves freedom of speech.

In other words, we are not talking about the fact that there is a single wave of anti-Israel protests and that everything is unbelievably bad. In fact, a considerable number of different processes are taking place at the same time. There are phenomena about which one can say that they have a right to exist if everything proceeds within the bounds of the law and does not offend anyone, even though they are not to my liking, and I am not taking part in them. I was recently in Toronto and saw a demonstration in the middle of the university campus. The demonstrators had plastered a clearing with posters, but this did not strike me as threatening or aggressive. I walked by two times and did not see anyone trying to check documents or anything like that. People were simply expressing their position. If the police and the university administration permit this, and people's legal rights are not violated, then such forms of protest are completely acceptable. But I know that this stresses many people because they perceive such forms of protest not as an innocent expression of opinion but as something destroying the consensus that was formed over a lengthy period of time, after we had reflected on the history of the Holocaust — the consensus that was formed in Western societies around what one can and cannot do in relation to Jews.

What we have here is anti-Zionism, which is a manifestation of antisemitism. Furthermore, taking part in these processes are many activists of Jewish background, who often say things like, "Because we are Jews, we cannot be against Jews. We are against Zionism, which is the epitome of colonialism, the bearer of genocidal practices, and the like." Here, too, we can observe parallels to the war in Ukraine. Some people say they are against Russia's aggression in Ukraine and are defending Ukrainians and Ukraine — the same way that they are defending Palestinians from Israel's aggression. This is first-order logic for them: We are against aggression here and there. We are defending innocent people here and defending innocent people there. Efforts to prove that Israel's actions are self-defense in a certain sense are futile because before 7 October 2023, there was peace, and no one attacked anyone until they were the first to attack us. Of course, this can be contradicted: "They did not attack unexpectedly. There were many causes. Let us look at the 'context.'" To this, one can reply: "This is what the Russian narrative says about defending itself against aggressive Ukraine and how the Donbas was bombarded for seven years." This chain can be extended a long way, but it seems clear to me that the one who is responsible for the sufferings of the civilian population is the one who attacked and started the war. And this is not Ukraine and not Israel.

One can argue and express criticism. No one is saying that it is forbidden to criticize Israel. But when the public discourse leads to defining those who attacked, burned, raped, and killed as innocent victims, that is a fundamental problem.

As I noted earlier, we are experiencing an exceedingly difficult period. What lies ahead? First, the war should end. When combat operations end and the degree of violence and hostility drops, this will also affect the entire discourse. But I am not convinced that everything will be forgotten quickly. I think that everything that is happening will leave a very deep trace. The university administration advised my colleague, an American professor from California, to stay at home and not show up on campus after demonstrating students splashed his office door with red paint, symbolizing blood. He does not study Israel, Palestine, or the Middle East. He simply has a Jewish surname, but that was enough. Undoubtedly, such events will leave a long-lasting, traumatic imprint.

The underlying factors for the situation that has emerged reside only partly in what is happening here in Israel and the Middle East in general. They reside within Western societies and are expressed in polarization, a cold civil war happening in many Western societies, and the lack of preparedness to create foundations for dialogue. Each side believes that the other is not worthy of being part of a discussion. As a result, it is becoming possible to utilize radical slogans and methods that border on direct violence. And the issue is not what is happening here in Gaza, but what pertains to mindsets and the situation on the streets in California, Boston, England, France, and elsewhere. This will not disappear after the Gaza War ends. It is incredibly sad to see how the idea or dream of a liberal society in which people respect each other's borders and understand that others, too, have rights and that you cannot do to others what you would not want to be done to you is turning into a prop. And this "cold civil war," which in many places is balancing on the edge of a hot one, has identified Israel and Jews as one of its targets.

In other words, we are seeing a wave of growing extremism and radical methods of political struggle in the world.

There is a general feeling that borders have stopped being borders and nothing is impossible. Look, it has already been ten years since that Boeing was shot down over the Donbas. This, too, is a harbinger signaling that what was impossible earlier is now becoming possible and that there will be no punishment or other consequences for this. The war in Ukraine has ushered in many such changes and behavioral models. What seemed impossible after 1945 is now the new normal again. This affects public consciousness because people reflect on why it is possible to do this there. They conclude that they, too, can allow themselves to splash paint on the doors of a professor with a Jewish surname. At the same time, they believe that their actions are anti-Zionist and that they are championing lofty principles. It would be fair to expect that, when these people are caught, they will be punished, at least ordered to pay financial compensation, or be jailed for a certain period because it is impossible to allow this to become the new normal. Instead, we see how a university in California, unwilling to tangle with protesters, is advising its faculty members to stay home. Or an institute in Paris believes that it is simpler to have their employees working from home and to shut down the building instead of stationing a policeman every three feet and fighting with young men trying to check the documents of employees and visitors to this educational institution.

"Whereas we in Israel have not even begun to reflect on how these two wars are connected, many people in Ukraine have understood from the outset that they are the same"

Do you see a connection between the Hamas-Israel War and the Russo-Ukrainian War? 

In the last 25 years of continuous collaboration, work, and communication, I have acquired many contacts both in Ukraine and Russia. Since the beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian War, things are not clear with my contacts in Russia, some of which I have lost. But my personal experience is this: After 7 October 2023, I received dozens of phone calls, e-mails, and texts on messaging apps from people in Ukraine expressing their sympathies and worries. They wrote: "How are you doing? We are with you. We are in the same boat." Compared to the 40 to 50 messages from Ukraine, there were only two messages of sympathy from Russia — out of the hundreds of people I know there. I do not want to generalize; this may not be proof of anything. But recognition to the Ukrainian side because, while we in Israel have not even begun to reflect on how these two wars are connected, many people in Ukraine have understood from the outset that they are the same. It has taken some time for us in Israel to arrive at this conclusion. Nevertheless, our coverage of 7 October and subsequent events quickly led to comparisons with Ukraine. When the media showed terrible scenes of corpses and the killings of civilians, TV commentators said, "This is awfully like what is happening in Ukraine. We never thought that we would get to this point." This put us in the same boat as the Ukrainians.

These wars are also similar in that they are part of the conflict taking place on the world's chessboard. On the strategic level, the same kind of model breakdown is taking place, when things that seemed absolutely incredible 15 or 20 years ago are now becoming a reality and strengthening the rules of the game. Countries are forming alliances, challenging established models of international relations in an effort to oppose people in the West, who always supposedly believe that they are right simply because they are wealthier. It turns out that the war against Israel and Ukraine is the result of such strategic conclusions, as well as a test of strength that is taking place on a global scale. This view of what is happening is becoming accepted. Why this does not affect the balance of power in practice remains an open question. Why is Israel not helping Ukraine if Iran is helping Russia? I indicated some reasons earlier.

A few weeks ago, our media reported that former Ukrainian defense minister Oleksiy Reznikov had at one time proposed sharing Ukraine's military technology for countering Iran's Shahed drones with his Israeli counterparts. He said Ukraine had, unfortunately, amassed experience in this sphere and was ready to explain how it worked so we could fight successfully. There was no response from the Israeli side. And three days ago, an Iranian drone killed a person in Tel Aviv. As always, all this is extraordinarily complex and contradictory. On the one hand, these are related phenomena that can be viewed as events of a single, major strategic party on the grand chessboard. On the other hand, one can pretend that we are focused on solving our specific problems and do not understand the connection to what is happening near Kharkiv or in other places in Ukraine.

"The reflexive avoidance of problematic topics does not strike me as healthy"

In these war realities, what should researchers of the Holocaust and Jewish Studies be doing? In Ukraine, we hear occasional calls suggesting that we concentrate Holocaust Studies exclusively on aspects that are "positive" for the country, for example, the activities of the Righteous Among the Nations, instead of raising topics that might resonate with Russian propaganda. How can we react better to this situation?

On the one hand, it is difficult for me to imagine that we will be seeing a flood of research published on these painful touchpoints and controversial topics. On the other hand, I will again emphasize that significant changes have occurred in this sphere in Ukraine. Serious research is being done on Ukrainian integral nationalism, events during the Second World War, and other topics. It cannot be said that these topics were ignored before the war, as they had been 25 years ago. You know this better than I do. But today, during the hot phase of the war, one can hardly expect that these subjects will be attracting considerable attention. If you look at the future, the reflexive avoidance of problematic topics does not strike me as healthy. These topics are part of unrestricted academic research. Considering that Ukraine is declaring and seeking in practice to approach Western standards in every respect, these standards relate to it, of course. Academic freedom in research assumes that a researcher chooses the topic that interests them. In this regard, it is difficult to imagine that in the near future, certain topics will be banned or affected by public pressure in Ukraine, the country we all wish to see after the war.

I can cite the example of Israel. In our country, there are many hot topics related to wars, to the War of Independence, etc. Much is being written and talked about this. Controversial studies are published and then refuted, and there are ongoing discussions. But these discussions are taking place, and it does not occur to anyone that you can put pressure on a student to write a master's or doctoral thesis on a different topic because the topic that interests them is too controversial and might help our enemies, so we should not touch it. If we do this, we will soon start self-censoring ourselves, and there will be little that does not help our enemies because any topic can be treated as one that aids the enemy. From my perspective, such an approach in this context is counterproductive. If we want, as we do, Ukraine to become a normal Western country and part of the united European community, especially the academic one, it is necessary to arm ourselves with the existing approach, which assumes that researchers themselves choose topics that appeal to them. We must help conduct these studies rather than silence, condemn, or label them as controversial. Otherwise, we can simply abandon academia and switch exclusively to propaganda.

The war situation is abnormal. On the one hand, it is possible to conduct a civil dialogue. On the other, it is a war in which missiles kill children, and these circumstances do not help raise the discussion to a level that is more or less objective. Everything depends on how mature the scholarly community in Ukraine is, on how much it understands, and how it is connected to what has been accepted and what is not. In our country, we have a splendid example of other former communist bloc countries. In Poland and Lithuania, many topics were considered troublesome 30 years ago, sparking astonishment and triggering scandals. Over the years, a gradual evolution has occurred, and these topics are discussed today. The government in power in Poland until recently sought to control the topic of historical memory and conflicted with scholarly circles. Historians stood their ground, declaring they were not politicians but scholars engaged in objective research and publishing what they found in archives.

Interviewed by Petro Dolhanov

The photographs in this publication are from open sources.

Semion Goldin is a senior research fellow at the Leonid Nevzlin Research Center for Russian and Eastern European Jewry in Israel. He received his PhD Cum Laude from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. His dissertation was published in Russian as a monograph under the title The Russian Army and Jews, 1914–1917.

Originally appeared in Ukrainian @Ukraina Moderna

This article was published as part of a project supported by the Canadian non-profit charitable organization Ukrainian Jewish Encounter.

Translated from the Ukrainian by Marta D. Olynyk.

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