Chapter 12.1: "Jews and Ukrainians: A Millennium of Co-Existence"
Jews and Ukrainians: A Millennium of Co-Existence is an award-winning book that explores the relationship between two of Ukraine’s most historically significant peoples over the centuries.
In its second edition, the book tells the story of Ukrainians and Jews in twelve thematic chapters. Among the themes discussed are geography, history, economic life, traditional culture, religion, language and publications, literature and theater, architecture and art, music, the diaspora, and contemporary Ukraine before Russia’s criminal invasion of the country in 2022.
The book addresses many of the distorted stereotypes, misperceptions, and biases that Ukrainians and Jews have had of each other and sheds new light on highly controversial moments of Ukrainian-Jewish relations. It argues that the historical experience in Ukraine not only divided ethnic Ukrainians and Jews but also brought them together.
The narrative is enhanced by 335 full-color illustrations, 29 maps, and several text inserts that explain specific phenomena or address controversial issues.
The volume is co-authored by Paul Robert Magocsi, Chair of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Toronto, and Yohanan Petrovsky-Shtern, Crown Family Professor of Jewish Studies and Professor of History at Northwestern University. The Ukrainian Jewish Encounter sponsored the publication with the support of the Government of Canada.
In keeping with a long literary tradition, UJE will serialize Jews and Ukrainians: A Millennium of Co-Existence over the next several months. Each week, we will present a segment from the book, hoping that readers will learn more about the fascinating land of Ukraine and how ethnic Ukrainians co-existed with their Jewish neighbors. We believe this knowledge will help counter false narratives about Ukraine, fueled by Russian propaganda, that are still too prevalent globally today.
Chapter 12.1
The past as present and future
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the establishment of an independent Ukraine profoundly changed the relationship of ethnic Ukrainians to the state in which they lived. For the first time in their history, the country's inhabitants were themselves asked to legitimize the new state by voting for or against independence in a referendum on 1 December 1991. As high as 92 percent of Ukraine's inhabitants — and an even higher percentage of its ethnic Ukrainians — voted in favour of independence. Hence, in contrast to previous regimes that ruled Ukrainian lands, independent Ukraine began its very existence with the active civic participation of its citizens, since no less than 80 percent of eligible voters voluntarily took part in the referendum on independence.
Ukrainians in a post-Communist world
A significant proportion of Ukraine's citizens, ethnic Ukrainians and Jews among them, have continued to play an active role in civic life. Participation in multi-party democratic elections at the local, regional, and national levels is now the norm in post-Communist Ukraine. The best example of civic commitment was the Orange Revolution at the very end of 2004, when an estimated 20 percent of the entire population of Ukraine took to the streets over a period of three weeks to protest what was believed to be the fraudulent results of the presidential elections.
The power of participatory democracy has encouraged ethnic Ukrainians to express their views on a wide range of issues. One of these has to do with defining just what it means to be Ukrainian. Is a Ukrainian someone who speaks the Ukrainian language and identifies with the Ukrainian nationality, or is a Ukrainian every citizen of Ukraine regardless of his or her nationality, native language, or religion? Despite the stipulation in Ukraine's constitution (1996) that "the Ukrainian people" are the "citizens of Ukraine of all nationalities," many people were — and to a degree still are — unclear whether being Ukrainian should be defined in civic (all citizens) or ethnic terms.
Ethnic Ukrainian citizens of Ukraine are themselves divided between what one might call activists and passivists. The activists are those who speak Ukrainian and who favor measures that can further enhance the Ukrainian language in schools, government, the media, and civic life in general. Those activists who consider language a significant social issue also tend to support Ukraine's integration into Europe and, therefore, oppose the pro-Russian policies of some Ukrainian politicians. The passivists are those who identify as Ukrainian (in the ethnic as well as civic sense) but who are likely to speak Russian and be less enthusiastic about affirmative-action measures on behalf of the Ukrainian language. Many passivists are uncomfortable with what they feel are the extreme nationalist views generally associated with the western regions of the country (especially historic Galicia). Instead, they try to adopt a more balanced approach that takes into account the reality of Ukraine's geo-strategic position between Europe and Russia. Some, however, reject outright the European Union orientation and support integration with the Russian Federation in the economic framework of that country's Eurasian Customs Union.
The events of 2013–2014 on Kyiv's Maidan have changed not only the political but also the socio-psychological landscape of Ukraine. The Revolution of Dignity and the aggressive actions and occupation by Russia of Ukrainian territory have seemingly transformed the majority of former passivists into activists. These new activists, whether of ethnic Ukrainian or other national/religious background, not only feel and act as citizens of what they now see as their country — Ukraine — they also support the new government's pro-European orientation as the only viable option for the future of their common homeland.
The perceptual differences between ethnic Ukrainian activists and passivists have colored opinion and debates about a wide range of identity-related issues. Should, for example, every citizen of the country be required to use the Ukrainian language in all forms of public discourse (education, media, government), or should Russian be made the second state language and, therefore, equal to Ukrainian? Should nationalist heroes, especially dear to western Ukrainians, be praised (or even mentioned) in school textbooks, and should heroes from the Soviet era who are remembered favorably in much of eastern and southern Ukraine be expunged from the educational system's historic narrative as well as removed (in the case of monuments) from public spaces? Should Ukraine have only one "official" Orthodox Church that is not under the jurisdiction of Moscow, and should the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church become a state-wide body or be limited to western Ukraine? These are the kind of questions that have preoccupied citizen observers and active supporters of the civic, cultural, and religious revivals that have been unfolding in Ukraine since independence.
Diasporan reaction to the new Ukraine
The efforts to create a sovereign Ukraine that began in the late 1980s and culminated with the creation of an independent state were warmly greeted and encouraged by diaspora Ukrainians. While their enthusiasm and commitment may have been genuine, it was inspired by an unrealistic image of the ancestral homeland — a homeland inhabited for centuries by allegedly freedom-loving ethnic Ukrainians who had been suppressed by Muscovite-Russian and Soviet rule, and who were eagerly awaiting the day when they could govern themselves in a manner that would guarantee democracy and economic prosperity. This was the image learned by generations of diasporan children, whether from parents at home or from teachers at Saturday Ukrainian-language schools.
It was almost inevitable, therefore, that such high expectations for independent Ukraine would turn to disillusionment once it became clear that several more generations would have to pass before the ingrained Soviet mentality and patriarchal nature of Ukrainian society could be replaced by the kind of European and North American cultural values familiar to the diaspora. In turn, people in Ukraine, both the governing elite and populace in general, gradually adjusted their own high expectations to a more modest view of what the diaspora can do — or not do — for them.
Despite disillusionment with the political and economic evolution of post-Soviet Ukraine, the very existence for over two decades of an independent state has transformed the basic mindset of the diaspora. Americans and Canadians of Ukrainian background now have a newly found sense of self-confidence. Aside from the fact that they are first and foremost Americans or Canadians, they no longer have to explain to others the status of the land of their ancestors. This is because Ukraine — with all its positive and negative features — exists. It is, in the end, a full-fledged country like any other in the world community.
It is with this sense of self-confidence, often backed by supportive statements and actions from the highest levels of the American and Canadian governments, that members of the Ukrainian diaspora were again galvanized to act during the 2013–2014 Maidan protests. They have persisted in calling on American and Canadian leaders to assist Ukraine, and they themselves have contributed financial support for the military struggle in eastern Ukraine as well as for the thousands of refugees and soldiers who have become victims of the ongoing "frozen war" with Russia.
Jews in a post-Communist world
According to the last Soviet census in 1989, there were 486,000 Jews in Ukraine. That number subsequently fluctuated — although generally in a marked downward trend — during the first two decades of Ukraine's independence. On the one hand, the number increased as a result of persons who during Soviet times had hidden their Jewish identity for practical reasons but who now reclaimed it. This was particularly important for those who had their sights set on emigration to Israel. According to that country's Law of Return, a person with at least one Jewish grandparent is eligible without restrictions to immigrate and settle permanently in Israel.
On the other hand, a negative birth rate (common to Ukraine's population as a whole), high levels of intermarriage in which children do not identify as Jews, and, most important, a high rate of emigration to Israel has resulted in a drastic demographic decline. By the time of independent Ukraine's first census in 2001, only 104,000 persons identified as Jews. It is true that various Western and Israeli-based agencies — and of course local Jewish leaders in Ukraine — tend to exaggerate the number of Jews residing in Ukraine, since the bigger the community, the more successful are their fund-raising campaigns. In fact, the number of Jews living in Ukraine continues to decline, so that on the eve of the next census (perhaps in 2016) there may be only 85,000 to 90,000 left in the country.
The Jewish revival
Since Ukraine became independent in 1991, Jews have experienced a remarkable cultural and religious revival. The revival has practically no class or political limitations and is not restricted to secular Jewish culture; therefore, it is quite different from the Yiddish revival of the 1920s. In any case, the vast majority of Jews in present-day Ukraine speak Russian or Ukrainian and very little, if any, Yiddish.
The rebirth of Jewish life has taken several forms. Beginning in the waning years of Soviet rule, Sholem Aleichem Societies of Jewish Culture sprang up in practically all the cities and towns of Ukraine that had a more or less significant Jewish population. The societies organized lectures, concerts, celebrations of traditional Jewish holidays, and above all they distributed humanitarian aid from the West. Other religious societies and communal institutions soon came into being, and by 1992 about three hundred of them were informally united under the umbrella organization called VAAD — the Association of Jewish Organizations and Communities of Ukraine. At the same time, Ukraine's authorities created a kind of puppet Jewish government institution, the Jewish Council of Ukraine, with appointed functionaries of Jewish descent loyal to the ruling regime. Although unpopular among the Jewish population at large, the Jewish Council functioned as a quasi-representational body and ensured that the government of Ukraine would have influence in Jewish communal developments and, most important, control over aid from abroad directed to Jewish communities throughout the country.
To help coordinate assistance from abroad, several dozen international Jewish bodies established branches in Ukraine. Three came to play an especially pivotal role in Ukrainian Jewish communal development: (1) the American Joint Distribution Committee (the Joint), which supported the establishment and functioning of long-lasting communal educational and social-relief programs, such as Hesed; (2) the Israeli Embassy in Kyiv, which not only assisted those leaving for Israel but also supported a variety of Jewish educational and cultural programs; and (3) the Jewish Agency for Israel (Sokhnut), which organized various educational programs in Israel for Jewish youth from Ukraine (Naaleh-16 program), established multiple-level Hebrew-teaching ulpans, and sponsored several local communal-building initiatives throughout Ukraine. The enthusiasm that inspired such assistance to Jewish communities in Ukraine was tempered by at least a decade-long period of competition, marked by often fierce conflicts and tactical alliances between the VAAD, the Joint, Sokhnut, the Jewish Council, and several other umbrella organizations.
The revival of educational, cultural, and communal life prompted the secular Jewish leadership in Ukraine to bring understanding of the Jewish historical past to a new level of institutional development and toward this end to create scholarly societies and institutions. Outside Jewish community circles, the Institute of Political Science and National Minorities of the National Academy of Sciences re-established the interwar Research Center (Kabinet) of Jewish Culture, but this rather inept institution has had little if any visibility. On the other hand, the VAAD established the Judaica Association of Ukraine, later transformed into the Judaica Institute of Ukraine and currently headed by Leonid Finberg. The Judaica Institute quickly became the epicenter of scholarly endeavours, sponsoring archival research, meetings with prominent Ukrainian scholars, round-table discussions between Christian and Jewish religious leaders and theologians, and art exhibitions in cooperation with leading galleries and museums in Kyiv. The Institute has also developed a prolific publishing program (Dukh i Litera), which includes a biannual almanac, Yehupets, perhaps the best Jewish literary and historical periodical published in any of the former Soviet republics.
The most stunning changes have taken place in Jewish education. Immediately following the proclamation of independence in August 1991, Jewish Sunday schools began to appear throughout Ukraine. Organized and staffed by professional teachers — only a few of whom had received any Jewish education in the interwar Yiddish elementary school system — the Sunday schools taught Jewish traditions, the Hebrew language, and Jewish history to people of all ages who were thirsty for knowledge denied them during seven decades of Soviet rule. Day schools were also established, as well as Jewish classes in state middle and high schools, which were supported either by secular institutions, such as the Israeli Embassy and the Joint, or by Hasidic religious organizations such as Habad.
Diasporan reaction to the new Ukrainian Jewry
In diasporan circles, the revival of Jewish religious life in Ukraine came to be called a "rabbinic revolution." A year before the declaration of independence and immediately following, dozens of rabbis and rabbinic scholars of all Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox denominations arrived from Israel, Europe, and North America to establish headquarters in dozens of Ukrainian towns where there were sizeable Jewish communities. A rabbi from the Bratslav movement went to Uman; several Habad rabbis to more than thirty cities and towns throughout the country (in particular Dnipro, Donetsk, Kyiv, and Kharkiv); a Skvira Hasidic rabbi to Berdychiv; and Orthodox non-Hasidic rabbis to Donetsk, Odessa, and Kyiv.
These religious leaders and scholars managed within just a few years to create a full-fledged communal infrastructure consisting of burial societies (hevrah kadishah), which renewed traditional burial rites at specially allocated cemeteries; rabbinic courts to resolve divorce and conversion issues; kosher kitchens and canteens for the elderly and poor; and matzo bakeries and butcheries to prepare kosher products. They also organized — and taught how to organize — communal festivities during major holidays, brought mohalim (specialists in circumcision) to circumcise Jews of all ages, and renewed Jewish weddings and bar/bat mitzvah rituals. In many places they organized informal Jewish education centers for people of different ages; most important of these were Jewish day schools, the largest of which are in Dnipro, Kyiv, and Odessa. Rabbinic leaders from abroad also established strong links with local authorities, and in some places they managed to secure the restitution of formerly Jewish communal real estate confiscated by the Communist regime. Finally, they reached out to local nouveau riches of Jewish descent, whose financial support together with funds from abroad have been used to renovate synagogues throughout Ukraine.
Many of the rabbinic leaders brought with them teachers from Israel, the United States, and Canada to staff the newly established schools. While these teachers had proper qualifications, there was still a serious need to educate Jewish enthusiasts from Ukraine. The latter may have had teachers' diplomas, but they often lacked even the most basic Judaic knowledge. In an effort to correct this deficiency, the VAAD of Ukraine, in co-sponsorship with the Joint and Sokhnut, established in 1993 the Ukrainian Center for Jewish Education. The center helped to implement several teacher-training programs and provided teachers and staff for the Kyiv-based Reform/Conservative Institute of Modern Judaism, the Judaic Studies Department of the International Solomon University, and the certificate and master programs in Jewish Studies at the National University Kyiv-Mohyla Academy. Aside from Jewish diaspora initiatives, the Canadian businessman of Ukrainian background, James Temerty, endowed in 2011 three professorial positions (chairs) in Jewish studies at the Ukrainian Catholic University in Lviv.
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